


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7 April 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2098



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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7 April 1980

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MUSLIM, ARAB SELF-EXAMINATION URGED

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 14 Feb 80 p 5

[Editorial by Ahmad Baha' al-Din: "Where Is Islam, in Relation to Oil, in Relation to International Struggle?"]

[Text] Where is Islam in relation to oil, to the struggle of the great powers, to the problems of the Third World, etc?

What is the matter with Islam, with all that has happened and will happen, despite the fact that it dominates, in one form or another, all newspaper headlines every day, without exception?

A revolution which bears the banner of Islam occurred in Iran. Opinions may differ among us about it, but the West has not left us an opportunity to catch our breaths. Moreover, Islam has transformed, suddenly and immediately in all foreign news media, into some sort of black danger, a backwardness, inimical to progress and a source of danger to civilization. That is because the Iranian revolution, by virtue of the circumstances, happened to become hostile to America in the first place, and became a threat to the oil which the entire West was gulping from it in the second place.

We have had, and still have, objections to the Khomeyni revolution. We have recorded some of our comments about its "Islamic" constitution, and we hope that events leave room for us to record the remainder. However, this was from a point of departure other than that of the West or of the international media which have explained Islam as "the Chadour" and "Execution at Dawn," and everything anyone says as from an Iranian student to an Ayatollah!

Then the Soviet Union undertook that blatant, shameless aggression against another Islamic nation, which is Afghanistan.

Suddenly, it appeared as though in international media and the Western press both had discovered that Islam has great humanitarian value, for which the entire world must mass a defense. Carter spoke of magnificent

Islam, and the camera lenses shifted to those people lurking in the mountains who are resisting Soviet tanks with their primitive weapons. The same newspapers stated: "However, they have a stronger weapon than tanks ... Islam!"

Now, really!

The American fleets are massing in the Gulf because Islam displeases them in Iran, and the Soviet tanks are invading Kabul because Islam displeases them in Afghanistan ... and each one sings his own tune!

The Islamic Arab nation and Islamic Arab policy are beaten down between the struggles of the great powers and the attacks of the arrogant world press. By virtue of their control over all publication, education and information media in their countries, they lead the vast masses with them into this downcast and fragmented state.

The issue to them is not a matter of Islam and schism ....

The object of the struggle is clear, obvious and visible!

The Object is Oil

The object of the struggle between the great powers is oil. This object has gained strategic positions on the international map. This object is the future of both great powers in their dreadful struggle. This object is the standard of living of individuals in America, Russia, England, France, Japan, etc.

The last thing on their minds is Islam, Arabism and every value to which we try to cling!

However, before we rebuke them we should rebuke the misguided among us!

Those who often applauded the former Shah, and who appealed and are appealing to the Americans to protect Islam, have no right to disapprove of the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan!

Those who invited Soviet influence have no right to disapprove of the American concentration around the abodes of Islam!

Those who called for national independence, Arab unity and nonalignment, and rejected the influence of both camps and their control; these are the only ones who have this right!

We do not say this to distribute the blame, nor to distribute the glory. For nothing is dearer to us than that everyone regain his senses, even if under the pressure of current events. We say this, however, so that the mistake and the deception will not be repeated, and so that we learn the lesson well.

The Arabic and Islamic peoples are coming out of a long, dreadful sleep!

Injustice and oppression, closure of the doors of thought and reasoning, factional and ethnic wars, and everything which befell this region of the world up to its subjection to the centuries-long darkness of the Ottoman rule: All of this made us pass through long acknowledged stages of evanescence which lasted for centuries. Then Arabic and Islamic awakening began, hand in hand in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and the darkness began to dissolve by the mid-twentieth century, at least when all of the Arabic and Islamic nations become independent countries!

#### We Blame Ourselves First

May the reader forgive me that I always desire to direct his attention to that for which we deserve to blame ourselves, before that for which we deserve to blame others!

I will not blame America, for example, although it desired to humiliate us and control us in order to obtain oil, then oil wealth, easily, submissively and cheaply in order to increase its prosperity, affluence and satiation ....

I will not blame Russia, although it desired to guarantee its boundaries, to expand its sphere of influence, to buttress its security against the United States and open ports for itself on the waters and oceans ....

I do not blame Russia or America, even if I have rejected both, at least when it is at the expense of my homeland and the values and principles in which it believes!

I blame myself, however, and I blame my people, and I blame my governments first of all. For if it were not for the points of weakness in the Arab and Islamic nature, it would not have been possible for all these dangers to have surrounded us, to have taken us by our throats and almost trampled us under their feet!

It was inevitable, when the Arabic and Islamic peoples had begun to regain their senses and recover from their unconsciousness, that they began to feel their way and recover their identity and self-confidence.

This would not have been possible if the community had not reviewed its history and the catastrophes which have embraced it throughout the centuries. This is not possible unless the community critically examines itself and differentiates the reasons for its progress from the reasons for its backwardness. This would certainly reveal the causes which made the Arabic people several peoples, and which made the Islamic religion several denominations.

It would not be possible as well for this review to be done except in a rational atmosphere of freedom of thought, tolerance, broadmindedness and vision, and all of those qualities which we extol and do not practice!

The Spirit of Despotism is Still in Us!!

However, none of this has occurred!

The spirit of Ottoman despotism is still in us, but it has changed from one overall despotism to various local despotisms.

If Arabic thought and Islamic thought had not been suppressed in the last hundred years in which they began to awaken, would we have found what we are finding now, from men of religion who declare the unlawful lawful, to youth of little knowledge who wish to regress a thousand years, to Muslims who exchange assassinations, to the Ayatollahs of the militants in Iran: How is it possible to make progress in such circumstances? And as for the plundering and usurpation from the outside world: How is it possible to resist the actions of pillage while we are this way?

The Islam which Allah revealed is one tolerant Islam, and the Prophet left it one tolerant Islam. It was the case, and is still the case, that there must again be one Islam, because all the denominations which ensued arose only for worldly and political reasons. It is only desirable for us to remain prisoners to them after one thousand four hundred years because this suits a ruler here or a leader there!

This at a time when this schism into denominations is an apostasy more dangerous than the apostasy of the apostates in the days of Abu Bakr ....

Arabism is One

Arabism, which is one family and a complete, integral legacy, will inevitably return to where it must return, purified of the defects of fanaticism, racism and the sectarianism. If reason prevails, regains its place and is liberated from the faults which infiltrated us in preceding centuries and under bygone circumstances, there will still be those with evil intentions, eager to continue it and to exploit it, and not out of belief in it!

What do I mean by this somewhat "fanatical" discourse?

Allah will not change anything in a nation until they change something in themselves!

"The self" is a very big word: It includes the mind and the heart, thought and emotion, instinct and conscience.



The fundamental fact in our Arabic and Islamic world is that the illiteracy rate is about 70%.

This imposes upon the "elite" a greater responsibility. The elite here are the ruling class, the thinkers, the writers, the journalists and newsmen, the teachers, etc.

The simplest thing I ask in this discourse is that I adjure this elite to try as hard as possible to deliver this community from its current intellectual and spiritual ruin.

I do not mean total ruin: This is a protracted matter. I mean the current reaction in the face of events of the past months and the current days.

#### We Desire Responsibility

What is required is only that we arrange things responsibly, and that each one take any opinion or inclination, but responsibly.

Islam is one thing.

The struggle for oil is another thing.

The struggle for spheres of influence and to acquire positions over our corpses is a third thing.

The differences between the Arab rulers and the Muslims is a fourth thing.

If the two great powers proud of their strength, and the nations of the industrial world drowning in their opulence, their selfishness and their opportunism, confuse Islam with oil and with strategy unconcerned that the world is being ruined, then this is a concept which we must not follow; we must not let our people fall prey to it.

Aggression against a Muslim or Arab people is rejected out of hand, and must be resisted until it departs. If we wish this bloc to remain cohesive--for without cohesiveness it has no future--differences in policies must not violate principles, for Islam has more than one color, and Arabism has more than one physical description.

After this, the differences will be of little importance!

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HELICOPTERS, BOMBS, MIG FIGHTERS IN GUERRILLA VALLEY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 Feb 80 pp 21-22

[Article by Timo Vuorela, dateline Shigal, Afghanistan]

[Text] HELSINGIN SANOMAT was the first to get into occupied Konar Province, where the green flag of the "Islamic Republic" is flying in a rugged landscape.

This week HELSINGIN SANOMAT reporter Timo Vuorela along with photographer Jorma Puusa visited Afghanistan's Konar Province, which the Muslim rebels have proclaimed to be the embryo of the "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan." No other foreign reporter has visited this region since the December revolution and the arrival of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

The trip took 5 days, 3 of which were spent trekking through the mountains. Because our border crossing was illegal it took an extra 2 days to evade Pakistani and Afghani officials.

We met the head of the stream of refugees just after we had crossed the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. We were at an elevation of almost 3 kilometers on a sharp ridge in a range of mountains which extends southward from the Himalayas. They trudged laboriously along the path which switch-backed up an almost vertical slope. They were advancing in a silent column along the snowy track in order to escape the civil war raging in their country. The snow ended at about the point their homeland ended, [and] on the other side of the ridge crest--the Pakistani side--the sun was shining.

They were as wretched looking as are refugees everywhere when coming from the poorest countries on earth. These people were traveling without any protection against the winter. Afghanistan's mountain folk are amazingly hardened to changes in the weather, but it is frightening to watch both women and children as well as men climbing dozens of kilometers barefooted through crusted snow, many children without any kind of trousers and some of the old people wearing only a single cotton rag as a shirt.

The children were crying from exhaustion and the cold. One elderly woman stood at a bend in the trail, all of her strength spent, calling repeatedly on Allah for help. They had climbed many hours along boulder-strewn paths and the worst of all was still ahead--the steepest, snow-covered upper slope.

They had set out from the Konar River Valley because of the bombings which began on Sunday, and by Monday evening most of them had reached the nearest Pakistani villages. But [the first] were followed by others--thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of new refugees.

From the clear, snow-covered summit we could follow from above the movement of the Afghanistan Government helicopters flying over the Konar Valley. The sounds of battle did not reach our ears, but later on in the same evening we were in time to see evidence of the fighting.

#### Illegally Into Afghanistan

We were entering Afghanistan illegally. The Kabul government no longer grants visas to Western journalists so it was not possible [for us] to get to the capital. There is even less chance that the government would give entry permits to foreigners who were going into areas held by the Muslims.

Our group was not large. There were two Finns, a guide from Peshawar, and a couple of porters, and we were joined by some Mojahedin from a small border village--a small contingent of Afghani Muslims who were returning "to the front" in the Konar Valley.

Our guide and the guerrillas all belonged to the same organization, Hizbe Islami, Afghanistan's largest political party, and to its guerrilla army. In March of last year Hizbe Islami Afghanistan (The Islamic Party of Afghanistan, or HIA) proclaimed Konar Province as the first territory of an "Islamic Republic." Hizbe Islami's green flag is now flying from a few rooftops here and there in Konar Province, bidding defiance to the attacking fighter planes.

#### Taking Cover From Air Attack

The day's air strikes are ending as we drop down into the village of Snou in mid-afternoon. A couple of times we have to run for cover because of the MIG fighters whistling overhead. Their targets, however, are farther down the Konar Valley. We hear only the sound of rocket firing above us; the explosions themselves are not within earshot.

We reached the Konar River towards evening. After getting off the primitive ferry on the far side we ended up at the barracks of the Mojahedin, the former police station--a white citadel which stands out as the best target in the barren landscape.

Depending upon the source questioned, four or five people have died in the Konar Valley during the 2-day bombing. On the far side of the river we saw one house mourning the loss of a male member of the family. The deceased had already been buried next to his home, just above the crater left by the rocket. A white flag of mourning fluttered at the gravesite.

The Kabul government uses large assault helicopters and MIG-fighters, both of Soviet origin, in the bombings. Air attacks are the only alternative [left to the government] at Shigal, since not even tanks can get beyond the blown-up highway bridge. To try to get to the areas held by the Mojahedin without tanks is useless.

According to the inhabitants of the valley, the government troops usually begin their attacks with a barrage of fire from heavy machine guns from the mountains further downstream. Then--always in mid-morning--the helicopters come, followed by the MIGs.

#### Huge Bomb Craters

The combat helicopters normally carry 2,000-kilogram bombs as well as several smaller bombs. The 1-ton bombs make enormous craters, a couple of meters deep and about 7 meters in diameter. The weaponry used on the helicopters also includes machine guns.

One would like to think that the large bombs were aimed at military targets. Two of them were dropped in the midst of civilian buildings, a couple of hundred meters away from the white barracks bunker. Four cows were killed. Two other large bombs were dropped almost a half kilometer away from the Mojahedin barracks in cultivated areas with no military targets in sight other than an old, abandoned truck. One--or probably two--of the rockets shot by the MIGs destroyed a civilian dwelling.

Dozens of bomb craters were left in the fields from the 2-day bombing and they present a peculiar picture of the accuracy of the helicopter crews. The rockets intended for the barracks have exploded far away on the mountain slope and in the midst of civilian dwellings.

The resistance [effort] seems to be of about the same order. The Mojahedin aim their Kalashnikovs at the planes and helicopters whenever the occasion arises, even though they realize it is futile. The helicopters do not come near enough, and when further away the armored plating they have on the underside protects them from even the anti-aircraft weapons of the Mojahedin.

Three anti-aircraft machine guns have been placed on three high hill tops south of Shigal, where they certainly protect Shigal commander Colonel Asilkhan's headquarters but not the village itself. One Mojahedin told about how a helicopter came flying high over his anti-aircraft gun emplacement and dropped a 1,000-kilogram bomb "just 10 meters away." This can mean almost anything, since the crest of the hill is hardly more than 10 meters away and a few steps to the side would mean a hundred meters down.

#### Konar Valley Under Guerrilla Control

The Konar Valley is, however, incontestably under the control of Hizbe Islami's Mojahedin. Jalalabad is 60 kilometers away, and the guerrillas are active up to within a couple of kilometers of the city, but only in the mountains.



The Mojahedin can range [up to] 15 kilometers southward from Shigal along the roadway. Then come Kerala and Chaghasaray, the provincial center of Konar Province, both of which are under the control of the government, although surrounded by the Mojahedin.

To the northeast the Mojahedin can, in their own words, "drive 300 kilometers by truck," or about as far as the Chinese border. They appeared to have at least two cars in use, but getting gasoline into a valley where all imported goods must be carried in over trails through the mountains is quite another problem.

#### Shielded by a Snowstorm

The following day was overcast; down in the valley it was raining [while] up in the mountains a blizzard was raging. In such weather there is no danger of air strikes on the Konar Valley, which was surrounded by mountains in heavy cloud cover.

On the third day there was a break in the weather. Because the weather had become [so] unpredictable, we had to set out on our return trip since there was no guarantee when the next opportunity would arise. To be stuck in the mountains in a blizzard would mean certain death. By noon we had reached the snow line, and from above the lower layers of clouds we could see that the sun was already shining on the Konar Valley. At the same time the helicopters were arriving, and we heard muffled booming from the river.

Konar Province is a good example illustrating the way in which Afghanistan is divided into two entirely different worlds. Konar's mountainous countryside is controlled by the Mojahedin of the Islamic party, Hizbe Islami; Chaghasaray, the provincial center of government, is in the hands of the army.

Colonel Hidayatullah, the young company commander at the Shigal headquarters, boasted that Hizbe Islami was in control everywhere other than the not quite 400 square kilometer area where the Chaghasaray garrison is stationed. His words should not be taken completely literally; by "control" he means something different from what is normally meant in Western usage.

#### An Isolated Army

The actual situation is that the government army is isolated in its garrison and keeps watch over the [provincial] center. The garrison is almost totally supplied by air, since from their mountains the Mojahedin are able to cut off traffic along the road leading to Kabul.

According to Hizbe Islami, the same sort of situation exists in about 20 other provinces. A few [provinces] have been "completely liberated" or purged of government troops. The reports issued by the government in Kabul partly dispute and partly confirm this [assessment of the] situation in different parts of the country.

## [Guerrilla Organizations] Go Solo

The political situation is as confused as the military situation. There are a half dozen guerrilla organizations or parties; each is trying to wage its own war in its own territory and each acts politically without any central coordination. The parties' talks aimed at unification are continuing the whole time in some form or other, but there is no sign of progress.

Hizbe Islami is overwhelmingly the largest of the parties and almost all of the "liberated territories" are under its control. In nearly all of them the situation is about the same as it is in Konar.

The population of [Konar] Province is 380,000. Electricity is available only in the cities. In the villages of Shigal and Shultan, for example, there are 24,000 inhabitants, but half of them are already refugees in Pakistan. There are 25 telephones within the boundaries of these two villages, all available to the Mojahedin.

## A Shortage of Food

In the cultivated areas of the river valley there do not appear to be as many workers as might be expected preparing [the soil for planting] because the stream of refugees took people of working age beyond the border. A week ago in Peshawar one Western source predicted that Afghanistan would be faced with an inevitable shortage of foodstuffs since the country has not had--nor even tried to have--a decent harvest during the 2 years following the April 1978 coup.

Scarcity is already being clearly felt in the Konar Valley, where steep hillsides are lined with beautiful terraced plots. The mountains supply water, which runs from house to house, a step at a time, through the village in carefully regulated brooks.

Foodstuffs must be brought in from Pakistan. Food supplies for the Mojahedin in particular are carried over the mountain paths on the shoulders of incredibly strong-legged Afghanis; 40 and even 60 kilogram loads move in an unbroken stream along precarious paths. On their return trips to Pakistan they carry furs, other hides, wood for construction, etc.

## Clowning Around With Firearms

The mood in Shigal is somewhat unreal. Young Muslim soldiers in particular feel as if they are involved in some sort of adventure. They plan and clown around with their weapons and seem to take little interest in ordinary living. On the other hand, they clearly fear the air attacks, [although] they have not yet had enough experience with these because they have not suffered losses.

Shigal's company commander was already a colonel in the government's army when he deserted to the Muslim side along with the entire 3,000-man Asmar

brigade in the Konar Valley. But the colonel seems to be quite inexperienced and only mildly interested in his country's affairs in general--at least he gives this impression with his indifference.

The commander for the Shigal region, Col Asil Khan, also preferred posing for the camera with his automatic rifle in hand to telling about the progress of the war.

#### Afghanistan's Akseli Koskela

Wahiddullah Sabawoon, chief of the Shigal-Shultan theater of operations, seemed to have a much clearer understanding of the nature and goals of the civil war. He was a civil engineer and had in no way been connected with the army. Wahiddullah seemed to be sort of a political advisor in an army of adolescents. This Akseli Koskela sort of man [Trans. note: an allusion to a leading character in Vaino Linna's novel, "Here Under the North Star"], who was head and shoulders above the others, seemed to command considerable respect in his relations with the Muslim soldiers he met in the party office on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

"Support for the Islamic revolution comes, in the first place, from Afghanistan's Muslims from both within [their] homeland and from outside," explained Wahiddullah. "Islamic organizations in other countries help us, [but] not a single government [aids us]."

The leader of the Mojahedin does not seem to have any idea as to what will ultimately become of Afghanistan's Islamic revolution. Wahiddullah said that, in terms of the laws and regulations of Islam, it would not differ from the revolution which has been carried out in Iran.

#### 'Rule by the Koran in Place of Tyranny'

Hizbe Islami's program calls for the "Islamization" of the entire country, which means the ascendancy of the Koran and the mosques "in place of tyranny." Naturally, the program calls for the prohibition of alcohol, adultery, indecency, gambling and other immoralities. The Islamization of [the laws] will involve many kinds of economic and political changes, and in some issues Islam is a progressive and a radical doctrine. Most striking to Western observers, however, is the fact that, according to Islamic law, adultery requires a death sentence for a woman and a flogging for a man.

Wahiddullah explains in a complicated manner how Islam is the foe of both communism and capitalism and how a peaceable relationship cannot arise between them. In practice, however, since the Soviet Union sent its troops into the country in December, Afghanistan's revolutionary movement has been moving in an exclusively anti-communist direction.

The leader of Hizbe-Islami is Gulbadin Hikmatjar, an engineer who is a violent anti-communist and a "neutralist" with regard to the Western countries and who has been in prison and been wanted for political crimes since the days of royal rule in the early 1970's.

The party is so powerful that some Mojahedins are calling "engineer Gulbadin" president. Hizbe Islami has 12,000 members and claims that its supporters amount to fully 88 percent of the people of Afghanistan. The figure is, of course, completely arbitrarily [chosen].

Hizbe Islami's program, [contained in a] small green booklet about the size of a pocket calendar, explains the party's goals in a manner calculated to appeal to Muslims, but politically more sensitive issues are left unexplained.

Afghanistan is a backward, agrarian state, where the ownership of agricultural land is concentrated in the hands of large feudal proprietors. Hizbe Islami's program gives no indication as to what [the party's] attitude would be toward large-scale landholding. Instead, Wahidullah the engineer says that "the rich landowners have acquired everything illegally and have not acted in accordance with Islamic precepts. Islam does not approve of exploitation. According to Islamic law, an agrarian reform is needed."

CSO: 8017/7491



## AFGHANISTAN

### BALUCHIS OF SOUTHERN IRAN AID AFGHANISTAN BRETHREN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Feb 80 p 23

[Article by Timo Vuorela; dateline Zahedan, Iran]

[Text] The Iranians have already become directly involved in the Afghanistan crisis and, according to Baluchi sources, the Baluchis of southern Iran have taken part in the fighting in Afghanistan. Officially, the government of Iran is unaware of this situation, although the [country's] highest political leadership has already promised assistance to Muslim brethren [in] Afghanistan in their struggle against the Soviet Union and the Marxist government of Kabul.

On the basis of conversations which occurred over a 3-day period in Zahedan, it appears that the Baluchis have from the outset taken the reins in their own hands, ignoring the government in Tehran. This is the way they have been used to operating for centuries.

#### No Questions Asked

Because of the situation in Afghanistan there is clearly more tension in the provinces of Sistan and Baluchistan. Foreign reporters are not allowed to visit the region. Several times officials wondered why no one had prevented two Finnish reporters from coming to Zahedan or had even inquired as to our business.

Already on our first day [there] the governor of Zahedan ordered us to leave as quickly as possible. It was not possible [for us] to interview any official of the [central] government or local administration. On the other hand, there was no attempt made to prevent our speaking with the local natives.

First we tried to meet mufti Movlavi Abdulaziz, the religious leader of the Baluchis. The Baluchis are Sunni Muslims, and mufti is the honorary title which corresponds to the great ayatullah of the Shiite sect, the

highest ranking leader below the imam. The aging mufti refused to receive any visitors. His son gave his father's heart condition and doctors' orders as the reason for this. Later on, it became evident that this explanation was an obvious pretext.

#### A Discussion About Minorities

On that same day we had an interesting talk about relations between the Baluchis and the Tehran government and Afghanistan's Muslim rebels at the home of a man who was one of the leading figures in the city. At the outset, the owner of the house was not present, and in his place were two younger male relatives. One of them, a student, described relations between the Tehran central government and the Baluchis as marked by a lack of trust. In his opinion, Iran's Islamic revolution is "a revolution by the unreliable Shiite Muslims, [and] the Sunni population has had nothing whatsoever to do with [it]."

The Islamic world is divided in two. In Iran the Shiites are a majority, and within the Sunni minority the largest groups are the Kurds and the Baluchis. Both minority nationalities want some sort of autonomy for themselves. The Kurds have recently once again [been involved in] a bloody clash with the revolutionary guards. In Baluchistan and Sistan things have been peaceful--apparently to a large extent because the southeast corner of Iran lies on the far side of a salt desert a thousand kilometers wide, one and a half hours by air away from Tehran.

#### An Unconditional Demand

The student from Zahedan explains that the unconditional demand of the Baluchis is for religious independence from the republic's Shiite government. In his view, to the Baluchis it makes little difference whether Tehran is governed by the Shah or by the Shiites. Religious viewpoints, along with their [accompanying] prejudices, are deeply rooted among the illiterate population.

[The student] says that the young people of Zahedan are not satisfied with the demands for reform by the religious leaders, which would mean only religious reforms [which would] apparently extend the influence of religion still further into all areas of life. Almost everybody regards imam Ruhollah Khomeyni, the leader of Iran's revolution, as more progressive than the government surrounding him.

#### Talked Too Much

While talking about the Afghanistan situation the same student tells [us] that men from Baluchistan have been involved in the fighting: "Our own men have gone to Afghanistan [and] they have seen Soviet tanks and troops and have taken part in the battles." Quite obviously, the young man was

saying more than he was supposed to. A moment later when the owner of the house arrived, he immediately began to wonder how foreign reporters happened to be in Zahedan. "Didn't anyone forbid you or prevent you from coming?" he asked.

As naturally as possible in the course of the conversation [the owner] stepped out of the room for a moment, joined us again, and said a few words in Baluchi, which our Farsi-speaking interpreter did not understand. [His] young relative was, in any case, visibly startled [and] soon left us not to return even to say goodbye as we were leaving.

#### Not Wanted in Two Languages

In order to cover ourselves we went straightaway to the headquarters of the local revolutionary council. From there, we were directed to the office of the governor, where it became apparent that our recent host had telephoned [the governor's office]. This sort of registration [on our part] thus turned out to be a wise precautionary measure.

The governor was expecting us. Smiling politely, he said that we were *personae non grata* in two languages. First in Farsi and then in German, he said, "Foreign reporters are not allowed in this region." He urged us to leave as soon as possible. Because it was no longer possible to arrange places on the flight leaving the next morning, our first opportunity was the flight to Tehran 2 days hence, and we intended to leave on [this flight] without a formal expulsion order.

#### Back To Afghanistan

Those 2 days tended to confirm [our] impression that the leaders of the Sunnis have taken [the idea of] holy war, or jihad, to heart. No one denied it, although most people knew nothing about it.

We met several Afghani. Some of them were in Zahedan as refugees, [and] others were guerrilla fighters for the rebel forces, who had sought shelter in the city from the merciless mountain winter.

A young, bearded Afghani, who, together with his friend, was leaning idly against the wall of an alleyway in the Zahedan bazaar, said, "Now, during winter, it is hard, but as soon as spring comes I'm going back to Afghanistan to fight the Russians." They told [us] that Soviet troops had taken control of all of the cities and towns in their home district in the southwestern part of Afghanistan. The Muslim rebels have withdrawn to the mountains where the winter makes it hard for them to move about too.

No one knows how many Afghani refugees or guerrillas are in Zahedan or elsewhere in Iran. Even a large number of them could easily melt into

this city of 100,000, because by dressing the same way as the local Baluchis they are able to move about without attracting attention.

#### Revolutionary Guards in Hiding

Ever since late December, when the Soviet Union began its large-scale military operation and brought Afghanistan almost wholly under its control, hundreds of thousands of refugees have crossed the border into western Pakistan. The Muslim warriors wander across frontiers pretty much as they please.

In Pakistan the refugees are in large camps and need outside assistance. In the eastern part of Iran they are, for the time being, so few in number that they are able to support themselves among their tribal brethren through their own labor. A few of the Afghanis, Baluchis and Pathans we met told [us] they worked mostly on construction [jobs].

Quite indicative of the mood of the Baluchis is [the fact that] Afghanis and other foreigners are able to move about in Zahedan in complete safety, but the pasdars, the soldiers of Iran's revolution, are not. The revolutionary guards stay in their headquarters [keeping] completely out of sight because, according to one resident, they will be shot if they appear on the street.

#### A Paradise for Smugglers

Open frontiers without supervision are an age-old privilege of the people of eastern Iran, and this has made Zahedan into a smugglers' paradise. A large portion of the hard drugs bound for Europe and North America on camel caravans heading westward flows through the sandy deserts and mountains of Sistan and Baluchistan.

During the busy afternoon hours one does not have to tarry long in a corner of the Zahedan bazaar before being approached by young men, every few minutes offering Mary Jane or a trip: "Hashish or opium, mister?"

#### Stereos Under Their Arms

In the shops of Zahedan one sees smuggled goods [ranging from] safety pins to television sets everywhere. Iranians come here from all over the country to buy home appliances and almost anything else. Tehran businessmen [bound for] the marketplaces of the capital city even carry several powerful stereo tuners [with them] aboard the airplanes.

Zahedan is really part of the province of Sistan, whose population includes more than 50,000 inhabitants of Persian extraction. The Baluchis, however, constitute the majority of the inhabitants of Zahedan. There are 100,000 Baluchis in Iran, an equal number in Pakistan, and significantly fewer in southern Afghanistan.



The Baluchis have as fierce a reputation as the Kurds of western Iran although in recent months the Baluchis have been the more peaceful people. A simple explanation for this is that the Tehran government has not even attempted any repressive operations in the eastern parts of the country.

#### Robberies, Murders

The wild west still lives. While considering making a trip by car from Zahedan to the frontier by way of Zabol, we were strongly warned about the robberies and summary killings which happened every day in the mountains. Robber bands consisting, for the most part, of wandering Afghanis, are responsible for these. News of these bloody deeds is rarely reported in the press.

Even in Zahedan [the weather] has the character of a high country winter. It is only a few degrees below freezing, but in the thin [air] the penetrating mountain wind makes life intolerable for foreigners not [yet] accustomed to it--until they understand the importance of protecting themselves from it. The best way [to do this] is to wrap a shawl--the large shawl used by the Baluchis and Afghanis--around one's head and neck so that only one's nose and eyes are visible. One soon learns how to recognize to which segment of the population a man belongs from the decoration on his shawl. Pakistan's Baluchis have the most beautifully decorated woollen shawls.

#### A Cold Night, A Morning Without Bread

In terms of the facilities available, Zahedan is no tourist center. After we passed by the city's best hotel in our thoughtlessness we finally ended up at a campsite intended for summer tourists, where there were some cabins with arched roofs made of concrete and as cold as a cellar. The stoves [inside] were not working so we were dependent on electric heaters. It might have been bearable if there was electricity available [the whole night through], but we found ourselves freezing more than ever in our lives. [This was especially true of] my photographer-colleague and our interpreter in his hut.

Our breakfast at the nearby hotel restaurant was spiced with politics. One customer got angry at the city's best hotel and in a rage shouted that things were a lot better under the Shah. The staff listened in embarrassment because the customer may have had good reason for his anger. The central heating was not functioning in the room he shared with his wife. The electricity was out. Not even the cold water was running in their bathroom, and, when they came to breakfast, there wasn't even any bread in the house.

ALGERIA

DECREE ON POWERS OF FOREIGN MINISTER

Algiers JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE in French 11 Dec 79 pp 954-955

[Decree No 79-249 of the Algerian President issued on 1 December 1979 on the Powers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs]

[Text] The President of the Republic,

On the basis of the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs;

Considering the National Charter and notably its Title V regarding foreign policy;

Considering the Constitution and notably its Articles 86 to 93 and 111, paragraph 7;

Considering Decree No 77-54 of 1 March 1977 determining the powers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs;

Decrees the following:

Art. 1--Under the high authority of the President of the Republic the Minister of Foreign Affairs is charged with the implementation of diplomatic action and conduct of the state's foreign policy.

Where appropriate, he elaborates, together with other ministries, all the programs, plans, and draft agreements with foreign governments.

He insures, together with the members of the interested government, the preparation of international meetings and conferences and represents the Algerian state in all international, regional, or subregional organizations in which Algeria is a member.

Art. 2--The Minister of Foreign Affairs sees to the consistency of diplomatic action abroad and to the unity of the defense of the interests of the state and its citizens through diplomatic and consular representations.

Art. 3--Only the Minister of Foreign Affairs is authorized to receive communications from heads of diplomatic missions accredited to the Algerian Government and to commit the state vis-a-vis foreign governments.

Art. 4--The Minister of Foreign Affairs sees to the drafting of international agreements committing the Algerian state. Interested ministries and organs are involved in this preparation.

Art. 5--The Minister of Foreign Affairs directs, in the name of the Algerian state, international, bilateral, or multilateral negotiations as well as those carried out with international organizations. He is authorized to sign all agreements, conventions, protocols, and regulations.

However, the direction and conclusion of a negotiation can be entrusted to another authority by virtue of the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Art. 6--The Minister of Foreign Affairs sees to the ratification and publication of international conventions, agreements, protocols, and regulations in which Algeria is a signatory or which commit Algeria. The same is true as regards the renewal or denunciation of these agreements.

Art. 7--The interpretation of international treaties, conventions, agreements, and regulations falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Following the advice of interested ministries, it defends the interpretation of the Algerian Government vis-a-vis foreign governments and possibly before international organizations or jurisdictions as well as before national organs.

Art. 8--The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is informed by other ministries on all matters that can have an impact on foreign policy. On its part the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will communicate to them all the information in its possession likely to be of interest to them.

Art. 9--The Minister of Foreign Affairs appraises the desirability of sending delegations abroad as do the other ministries and public organs.

He is involved by right in all the activities of these delegations and notably through the intermediary of diplomatic missions accredited to countries receiving the delegations.

Art. 10--Representations abroad to Algerian administrations, public entities, and national companies are placed under the authority of the chief of the diplomatic mission accredited to those countries where they are installed.

The diplomatic mission is informed of the activity of these representations and gives periodic account of their operations.

Art. 11--The Ministry of Foreign Affairs exercises its administrative authority over Algerian citizens abroad.

Art. 12--The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is involved in the elaboration of every decision relating to Algerian individuals or corporate entities abroad or to foreign individuals or corporate entities in Algeria.

Art. 13--Decree No 77-54 of 1 March 1977 determining the powers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs is abrogated.

Art. 14--The present decree will be published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE.

Signed in Algiers, 1 December 1979.

[signed] Chadli Bendjedid

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CSO: 4400

ALGERIA

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATION OF FOREIGN MINISTRY DECREED

Algiers JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE in French 11 Dec 79 pp 955-959

[Decree No 79-250 of the Algerian President issued on 1 December 1979 on the Organization of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

[Text] The President of the Republic,

On the basis of the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Considering the Constitution and notably its Article 111, paragraph 10;

Considering Decree No 79-249 of 1 December 1979 determining the powers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs;

Considering Decree No 77-55 of 1 March 1977 on the organization of the central administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Considering Decree No 77-77 of 25 April 1977 on the general secretaries of ministries;

Decrees the following:

Art. 1--Under the authority of the minister, the central administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes the following besides the general secretariat:

1. The general directorate of international economic relations;
2. The directorate of international political affairs;
3. The directorate of Arab countries;
4. The directorate of Africa;
5. The directorate of Asia and Latin America;



6. The directorate of the socialist countries of Europe;
7. The directorate of Western Europe and North America;
8. The directorate of the protocol;
9. The directorate of press and information;
10. The directorate of consular affairs;
11. The directorate of general administration; and
12. The directorate of foreign communications.

Art. 2--The general secretariat includes the following:

1. The general secretary; and
2. Two deputy general secretaries.

Art. 3--The general secretary assists the minister in the accomplishment of his duties.

Art. 4--The two deputy general secretaries assist the minister and the general secretary.

They can be charged with particular tasks of a political and/or economic character.

Art. 5--The following subdirectorates fall under the jurisdiction of the general secretariat:

1. The subdirectorates of legislation and treaties;
2. The subdirectorates of mail, archives, passports and other travel documents;
3. The subdirectorates of coding;
4. The subdirectorates of interpretership and translations; and
5. The subdirectorates of data-processing.

The subdirectorates of legislation and treaties is charged with implementing the necessary legal procedures for the conclusion and ratification of agreements and conventions to which Algeria is a party as well as the elaboration of regulations applying to or of interest to the ministry. It is also charged with overseeing, together with the various directorates involved of

the ministry, the study of texts of a legislative or regulative nature submitted for the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Additionally, it is authorized to interpret treaties, agreements, or any other diplomatic documents to which Algeria is a signatory.

The subdirectorates of mail, archives, and passports and other travel documents is charged with receiving, registering, and distributing the "in" mail as well as registering and transmitting the "out" mail. It alone is authorized to place seals on outgoing diplomatic and consular pouches and to open these on arrival. It is also charged with the keeping and care of archives. Additionally, it issues passports and other travel documents drawn up under the seal of the ministry and effects all the necessary formalities relating to missions abroad.

The subdirectorates of coding is charged with the coding and decoding of messages emanating from or received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as with protecting communications.

The subdirectorates of interpreters and translations is charged with all the interpreting work of the ministry as well as with the translation of documents.

The subdirectorates of data-processing is charged with computerizing the management of the various sectors of activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Art. 6--The general directorate of international economic relations is charged with economic, cultural, social, scientific, and technical relations of a multilateral nature at the international or interregional level as well as with Algeria's participation in organizations, conferences, and consultations pertaining to them.

It is also charged with following up all of Algeria's cooperation activities. Additionally, it can be empowered to handle some matters that can have an impact on Algeria's international economic relations.

Art. 7--The general directorate of international economic relations, placed under the responsibility of a general director and assisted by a director, includes the following:

1. The subdirectorates of economic and financial affairs, charged with the preparation of Algeria's participation in the economic and financial conferences of the United Nations system or pertaining to them and in interregional conferences of an economic and financial character as well as with the follow-up of cooperation among developing countries.

2. The subdirectorates of planning, international cooperation, and coordination charged with the collection of all appropriate data and information as well as with their exploitation with the purpose of planning the activities

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the field of economic, cultural, social, scientific, and technical cooperation as well as the coordination of this activity as it flows from actions undertaken through the geographic directorates.

3. The subdirectorates of cultural and social affairs and of scientific and technical cooperation charged with the handling of scientific, cultural, and social affairs and technical cooperation occurring at the international or interregional levels and with Algeria's preparation for participation at conferences pertaining to them.

Art. 8--The directorate of international political affairs is charged with the implementation of national policy in the field of international political relations and of legal and humanitarian matters of a multilateral character at the international or interregional level as well as with Algeria's participation in the organizations, conferences, and consultations pertaining to them.

Additionally, it can be empowered to handle certain matters that can have an impact on Algeria's international political relations.

Art. 9--The directorate of international political affairs includes the following:

1. The subdirectorates of political planning and coordination, charged with the collection of all appropriate data and information as well as their exploitation for the purpose of planning the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the field of international relations as well as the coordination of these activities flowing from actions undertaken by the geographic directorates.

2. The subdirectorates of United Nations affairs and of strategic affairs and disarmament, charged with the coordination and handling of political issues examined by the United Nations as well as with organic relations connected with the latter, with the follow-up of major international problems of a strategic character, and particularly of disarmament problems.

3. The subdirectorates of political affairs and interregional conferences, charged with the handling of all political affairs examined within the movement of nonaligned nations, preparations of Algeria's participation in interregional conferences of a political character, and with the follow-up of decisions taken in this framework.

4. The subdirectorates of multilateral treaties and conventions, charged with overseeing the application of administrative and legal conventions to which Algeria is a party as well as the preparation of negotiations of multilateral treaties and international conventions having an administrative, legal, or humanitarian character.

Art. 10--The directorate of Arab countries, charged with the implementation of national policy concerning Algeria's relations with the Arab League and the Arab states, includes the following:

1. The subdirectorates of the Arab League, charged with preparing Algeria's participation in the activities of the Arab League in the political, economic, financial, social, cultural, and scientific fields as well as with the follow-up of the decisions taken.
2. The subdirectorates of the Maghreb, charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the states of the Maghreb in the fields of political, economic, financial, cultural, and scientific relations on the bilateral as well as the multilateral levels.
3. The subdirectorates of the Mashreq, charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the states of the Mashreq in the fields of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and scientific relations.

Art. 11--The directorate of Africa, charged with the implementation of national policy for Algeria's relations with the Organization of African Unity or other African subregional organizations and African states, includes the following:

1. The subdirectorates of the OAU and subregional organizations, charged with the preparation of Algeria's participation in the activities of the OAU and other African organizations in the political, economic, financial, social, cultural, and scientific fields, with the follow-up of decisions taken, as well as with questions relating to the liberation movements.
2. The subdirectorates of West Africa, charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the countries of West Africa in the fields of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and scientific relations.
3. The subdirectorates of southern, central, and East Africa, charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the countries of southern, central, and East Africa, member-states of the OAU, and in the field of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and scientific relations.

Art. 12--The directorate of Asia and Latin America, charged with the implementation of national policy for Algeria's relations with the countries of Asia and Latin America and existing regional or subregional organizations, includes the following:

1. The subdirectorates of western Asia, charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the countries of western Asia in the field of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and



scientific relations as well as with the follow-up of the activities of the subcontinent's organizations.

2. The subdirectorates of eastern Asia, charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the countries of eastern Asia in the field of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and scientific relations.

3. The subdirectorates of South America, charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the countries of South America in the field of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and scientific relations.

4. The subdirectorates of central America and the Caribbean, charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the countries of central America and the Caribbean in the field of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and scientific relations.

Art. 13--The directorate of the socialist countries of Europe, charged with the implementation of national policy for Algeria's relations with the socialist countries of Europe and the organizations of the socialist countries of Europe, includes the following:

1. The subdirectorates of the organizations of the socialist countries of Europe and the Soviet Union, charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the USSR in the field of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and scientific relations as well as with the follow-up of the activities of the organizations of the socialist countries.

2. The subdirectorates of the socialist countries of central and southern Europe, charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the socialist countries of central and southern Europe in the field of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and scientific relations.

Art. 14--The directorate of Western Europe and North America, charged with the implementation of national policy for Algeria's relations with the countries of Western Europe and North America and those of the European Communities, includes the following:

1. The subdirectorates of the member-states of the European Communities, charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the member-states of the European Communities both on the bilateral and the Community level in the field of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and scientific relations as well as in the field of emigration.

2. The subdirectorates of the western countries of northern, central, and southern Europe charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the western countries of northern, central, and southern

Europe in the field of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and scientific relations as well as the follow-up of the activities of the subregional organizations.

3. The subdirectorates of North America charged with the follow-up and implementation of national policy vis-a-vis the countries of North America in the field of political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and scientific relations as well as the follow-up of the activities of Western organizations.

Art. 15--The directorate of protocol is charged with questions relating to foreign diplomatic and consular missions in Algeria and with Algerian diplomatic and consular missions abroad, international representations and cultural centers, as well as with questions concerning the situation of the members of these missions and representations in the framework of the Vienna conventions on diplomatic and consular relations and appropriate Algerian legislation. It is also charged with organizing the visits of foreign official personalities in Algeria.

Art. 16--The directorate of protocol includes the following:

1. The subdirectorates of visits and programs;
2. The subdirectorates of immunities and privileges; and
3. The subdirectorates of ceremonial affairs.

The subdirectorates of visits and programs is charged with the preparation and programming of the visits, ceremonies, and official events as well as the follow-up of questions relating to precedence. It sees to the reception and escort of official delegations and personalities arriving in Algeria as well as the organization of audiences sought in this framework or those sought from various Algerian authorities by members of the diplomatic corps.

The subdirectorates of immunities and privileges is charged with questions of immunities and privileges and diplomatic exemption, the supervision of diplomats whether consular or similar individuals accredited to Algeria, the keeping of the diplomatic roster, the consular list, the directory of Algerian embassies and consulates, the handling of questions relating to diplomatic premises, the issuing of identity cards, gray cards, and automobile license plates for the diplomatic corps, members of international organizations, and special foreign missions, as well as visas in diplomatic passports.

The subdirectorates of ceremonial affairs is charged with the organization of ceremonials, the initiation of accreditation procedures, and the drawing up of accreditation letters, letters of authorization, consular certificates, as well as formulating requests of approval or exequatur.

Art. 17--The directorate of press and information, official spokesman of the ministry, is charged with organizing and coordinating press activities in the framework of Algeria's diplomatic action and providing information to all the ministry's organs. It includes the following:

1. The subdirectorate of analysis and information management; and
2. The subdirectorate of foreign relations.

The subdirectorate of analysis and information management is charged with the collection, the analysis of information, and its circulation. It has jurisdiction in the field of information management and keeps the pertinent records up to date. It is also charged with the centralization of the general documentation.

The subdirectorate of foreign relations is charged with receiving and implementing requests of accreditation by members of the foreign press. It participates in the preparation of the negotiations of agreements or conventions in the field of information and press. It is charged with their follow-up and implementation and, in a general way, with relations with the national and foreign press.

Art. 18--The directorate of consular affairs is charged with the protection abroad of the interests and legal, administrative, and social position of Algerian citizens, individuals and corporate entities as well as the negotiation and implementation of consular, establishment, or legal cooperation conventions and other questions involving the status of aliens in Algeria.

Art. 19--The directorate of consular affairs includes the following:

1. The subdirectorate of the protection of nationals abroad; and
2. The subdirectorate of the movement and settlement of foreigners.

The subdirectorate of the protection of nationals abroad is charged with questions relating to the general situation of Algerian citizens abroad, the conditions of their stay, the protection of their interests and property, as well as the care of personal status documents drawn up or transcribed by Algerian consular services, issuing copies of these documents, their legalization, certification, and authentication. It is also charged with the preparation of the negotiation and implementation of consular, establishment, or legal cooperation conventions as well as the settlement of claims, notably in the field of citizenship and the follow-up of legal affairs, the registration of Algerians abroad, the issuing of passports and other travel documents, matters pertaining to the military draft, as well as the application of chancery dues.

The subdirectorate of the movement and settlement of foreigners is charged with the implementation of conventions relating to the settlement of aliens

in Algeria (the status of foreigners, of their property, foreign institutions and associations, tax conventions and agreements to avoid double taxation), the follow-up of maritime and air-connected matters, those relating to the movement of foreign individuals, to border agreements (regulation of the entry into Algeria of foreigners and of the conditions for the granting of entry, residence, and settlement visas), and conventions relating to border surveillance. It is additionally charged with the protection of refugees and stateless individuals.

Art. 20--The directorate of general administration is charged with managing personnel overall, their training and their social progress, the preparation and implementation of operating and capital budgets, the provision of supplies to organs and the administration of personal property and real estate.

Art. 21--The directorate of the general administration includes the following:

1. The subdirectorate of personnel, charged with the management and training of personnel;
2. The subdirectorate of finance, charged with the preparation, elaboration, and execution of operating and capital budgets;
3. The subdirectorate of equipment and materials, charged with the elaboration and execution of equipment and supplies agreements, acquisitions, the maintenance and management of motor vehicles as well as the management of all movable property and real estate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and
4. The subdirectorate of document reproduction, charged with the management of the printing press, the printing and copying of documents, and the micro-film archives.

Art. 22--The directorate of foreign communications, charged with insuring the operation of the communications network of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, includes the following:

1. The technical subdirectorate, charged with technical studies, control, and implementation of regulations applying to foreign communications; and
2. The subdirectorate of operations, charged with the operations of the communications networks and equipment.

Art. 23--A joint decree of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, and the authority in charge of the civil service will determine the internal organizational division into bureaus of the central administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Art. 24--Decree No 77-75 of 1 March 1977 on the organization of the central administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is abrogated.



Art. 25--The Minister of Foreign Affairs the Minister of Finance, and the authority in charge of the civil service are charged, each in his own field, with the execution of the present decree which will be published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE.

Signed in Algiers, 1 December 1979.

[signed] Chadli Bendjedid

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CSO: 4400

## ALGERIA

### APPOINTMENTS OF DIRECTORS, DEPUTY DIRECTORS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY NOTED

Algiers JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE in French 11 Dec 79 pp 960-961

[Twelve decrees issued on 1 December 1979 on the Appointment of Directors and Deputy Directors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

[Text] Decree of 1 December 1979 on the appointment of the director of the general administration

By decree of 1 December 1979 Mohamed Chenaf is appointed director of the general administration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Decree of 1 December 1979 on the appointment of the director of protocol

By decree of 1 December 1979 Mostefa Bouakkaz is appointed director of protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Decree of 1 December 1979 on the appointment of the director of consular affairs

By decree of 1 December 1979 Youcef Kraiba is appointed director of consular affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Decree of 1 December 1979 on the appointment of the director of press and information

By decree of 1 December 1979 Benyoucef Baba Ali is appointed director of press and information in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Decree of 1 December 1979 on the appointment of the director of foreign communications

By decree of 1 December 1979 Mohamed Saferjeli is appointed director of foreign communications.

Decree of 1 December 1979 on the appointment of the director of the Arab countries section

By decree of 1 December 1979 Ahmed Baghli is appointed director of the Arab countries section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Decree of 1 December 1979 on the appointment of the director of the African section

By decree of 1 December 1979 Abdelouahab Abada is appointed director of the African section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Decree of 1 December 1979 on the appointment of the director of the section of European socialist countries

By decree of 1 December 1979 Nourdine Kerroum is appointed director of the section of European socialist countries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Decree of 1 December 1979 on the appointment of the director of the section of Western Europe and North America

By decree of 1 December 1979 Saadedine Benouniche is appointed director of the section of Western Europe and North America.

Decrees of 1 December 1979 on the appointment of deputy directors

By decree of 1 December 1979 Zoubir Akine Messani is appointed deputy director of the western countries of northern, central and southern Europe.

By decree of 1 December 1979 Mahieddine Abed is appointed deputy director of the member-states of the European Communities.

By decree of 1 December 1979 Ahmed Chouaki is appointed deputy director of multilateral treaties and conventions.

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CSO: 4400

ALGERIA

DECREE ON FOREIGN MINISTRY CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION BUREAUS

Algiers JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE in French 11 Dec 79 pp 961-964

[Interministerial Order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, and the Secretary General of the Presidency issued on 1 December 1979 on the Organization of the Bureaus of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

[Text] The minister of Foreign Affairs,

The Minister of Finance, and

The Secretary General at the Presidency,

Considering Decree No 79-250 of 1 December 1979 on the organization of the central administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Order the following:

Art. 1--The organization into bureaus of the subdirectorates established by Decree No 79-250 of 1 December 1979 mentioned above is determined according to the provisions detailed below.

Art. 2--The subdirectorate of mail, archives, and passports and other travel documents falling under the jurisdiction of the general secretariat includes the following bureaus:

1. Bureau of mail and archives; and
2. Bureau of passports and other travel documents.

Art. 3--The subdirectorates in the general directorate of international economic relations include the following bureaus:

1. For the subdirectorate of economic and financial affairs:



a. Bureau of economic and financial conferences of the United Nations system or pertaining to it; and

b. Bureau of cooperation among developing countries and specialized interregional conferences.

2. For the subdirectorates of planning, international cooperation, and coordination:

a. Bureau of planning and coordination; and

b. Bureau of organic relations with the specialized economic organs of the United Nations.

3. For the subdirectorates of cultural and social affairs and of scientific and technical cooperation:

a. Bureau of scientific and cultural affairs and of technical cooperation in the framework of the United Nations system and of interregional conferences; and

b. Bureau of social affairs in the framework of the United Nations system and of interregional conferences.

Art. 4--The subdirectorates in the directorate of political affairs include the following bureaus:

1. For the subdirectorates of political planning and coordination:

a. Bureau of political planning; and

b. Bureau of coordination.

2. For the subdirectorates of United Nations affairs:

a. Bureau of political affairs and organic relations with the United Nations; and

b. Bureau of strategic affairs and disarmament.

3. For the subdirectorates of interregional political affairs:

a. Bureau of the nonaligned; and

b. Bureau of various interregional conferences.

4. For the subdirectorates of multilateral treaties and international conventions:

- a. Bureau of administrative and legal conventions; and
- b. Bureau of humanitarian affairs.

Art. 5--The subdirectorates in the directorate of Arab countries include the following bureaus:

- 1. For the subdirectorate of the Arab League;
  - a. Bureau of political affairs; and
  - b. Bureau of economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technical cooperation.
- 2. For the subdirectorate of Maghreb countries:
  - a. Bureau of bilateral relations; and
  - b. Bureau of subregional affairs.
- 3. For the subdirectorate of Mashreq countries:
  - a. Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq bureau;
  - b. Egypt, Sudan, Yemen Arab Republic, and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen bureau; and
  - c. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Oman bureau.

Art. 6--The subdirectorates in the directorate of Africa include the following bureaus:

- 1. For the subdirectorate of the Organization of African Unity and sub-regional organizations:
  - a. Bureau of political affairs and liberation movements; and
  - b. Bureau of economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technical cooperation.
- 2. For the subdirectorate of West Africa:
  - a. Mali, Niger, Chad, Upper Volta, and Mauritania bureau;
  - b. Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde bureau; and
  - c. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria bureau.

3. For the subdirectorates of southern, central, and East Africa:

- a. Central Africa bureau;
- b. East Africa bureau; and
- c. Southern Africa bureau.

Art. 7--The subdirectorates in the directorate of Asia and Latin America include the following bureaus:

1. For the subdirectorates of western Asia:

- a. Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan bureau; and
- b. India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Burma, Bhutan, and Maldives bureau.

2. For the subdirectorates of eastern Asia:

- a. China, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Mongolia bureau; and
- b. Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Australia-Oceania bureau.

3. For the subdirectorates of South America:

- a. Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay bureau; and
- b. Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador bureau.

4. For the subdirectorates of central America and the Caribbean:

- a. Central America bureau; and
- b. Caribbean bureau.

Art. 8--The subdirectorates in the directorate of the socialist countries of Europe include the following bureaus.

1. For the subdirectorates of the organizations of the socialist countries of Europe and the Soviet Union;

- a. Bureau of the organizations of socialist countries and of bilateral political affairs;
- b. Bureau of bilateral economic and financial relations; and
- c. Bureau of bilateral cultural, scientific, technical, social, and technological relations.

2. For the subdirectorates of the socialist countries of central and southern Europe:

- a. Bureau of the socialist countries of central and southern Europe; and
- b. Bureau of the socialist countries of the Balkans.

Art. 9--The subdirectorates in the directorate of Western Europe and North America include the following bureaus:

1. For the subdirectorates of the member-states of the European Communities:

- a. Bureau of bilateral political affairs and emigration;
- b. Bureau of bilateral economic, financial, cultural, social and technological relations; and
- c. Bureau of relations with the European Communities.

2. For the subdirectorates of the western countries of northern, central, and southern Europe:

- a. Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Austria, and Switzerland bureau; and
- b. Portugal, Spain, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, and the Vatican bureau.

3. For the subdirectorates of North America:

- a. Bureau of bilateral political affairs and of Western organizations; and
- b. Bureau of bilateral economic, financial, cultural, social, and technological relations.

Art. 10--The subdirectorates in the directorate of protocol include the following bureaus:

1. For the subdirectorates of visits and programs:

- a. Bureau of official visits;
- b. Audience bureau; and
- c. Reception bureau.

2. For the subdirectorates of immunities and privileges:

- a. Immunities bureau;

- b. Bureau of diplomatic and consular personnel; and
- c. Bureau of diplomatic premises.
- 3. For the subdirectorates of ceremonial affairs:
  - a. Bureau of ceremonial affairs;
  - b. Bureau of accreditations; and
  - c. Bureau of the technical organization of conferences.

Art. 11--The subdirectorates in the directorate of press and information include the following bureaus:

- 1. For the subdirectorates of analysis and information management:
  - a. Analysis bureau;
  - b. Bureau of information management and records; and
  - c. Bureau of general documentation.
- 2. For the subdirectorates of foreign relations:
  - a. Bureau of accreditations and agreements; and
  - b. Bureau of relations with the press.

Art. 12--The subdirectorates in the directorate of consular affairs include the following bureaus:

- 1. For the subdirectorates of the protection of nationals abroad:
  - a. Bureau of the chancery and personal status records;
  - b. Bureau of personal status and claims;
  - c. Bureau of social affairs; and
  - d. Bureau of statistics and coordination.
- 2. For the subdirectorates of the movement and settlement of foreigners:
  - a. Bureau of visas and maritime- and air-related matters;
  - b. Bureau of the protection of refugees and stateless individuals; and
  - c. Bureau of administrative and legal affairs.



Art. 13--The subdirectorates in the directorate of the general administration include the following bureaus:

1. For the subdirectorate of personnel:
  - a. Bureau of personnel management;
  - b. Bureau of recruitment and training;
  - c. Bureau of social affairs; and
  - d. Bureau of general affairs.
2. For the subdirectorate of finance:
  - a. Bureau of the budget;
  - b. Bureau of accounting and central administration;
  - c. Bureau of emoluments and wages; and
  - d. Bureau of control.
3. For the subdirectorate of equipment and materials:
  - a. Bureau of contracts and equipment;
  - b. Bureau of supplies;
  - c. Bureau of maintenance and upkeep; and
  - d. Bureau of motor vehicles.
4. For the subdirectorate of document reproduction:
  - a. Bureau of document reproduction;
  - b. Bureau of printing; and
  - c. Bureau for the reproduction of documents on microfilm.

Art. 14--The subdirectorates in the directorate of foreign communications include the following bureaus:

1. For the technical subdirectorate:
  - a. Bureau of technical studies; and
  - b. Bureau of regulations and controls.

2. For the subdirectorate of operations:

a. Bureau of networks; and

b. Bureau of personnel and equipment.

Art. 15--The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, and the Secretary General at the Presidency are charged, each in his own field, with the execution of the present order which will be published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE.

Signed in Algiers on 1 December 1979.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
[signed] Mohamed Seddik Ben Yahia

The Minister of Finance,  
[signed] Mohamed Hadj Yala

The Secretary General at the Presidency,  
[signed] Abdelmalek Benhabyles

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CSO: 4400

# NEW GENERATION OF MILITARY COMMANDERS APPOINTED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 25 Jan 80 pp 30-31

[Article by Hamdi Lutfi: "The October Commanders: Their New Military Positions"]

[Text] Beginning with the new year, 1980, a series of military transfers among certain specific leadership posts occurred in our armed forces.

The October commanders have assumed their new posts. None of them have been very far from that [war]; all gave the utmost in human effort for that noblest of wars, 1973. After the October war, and throughout the past six years, they took part in building up the foundations of the Egyptian military establishment derived from the spirit of victory, not defeat.


The new leadership appointments, beginning in 1980, were done to assure the steadfastness of the October spirit, its profound expansion, and to continue to raise its banners without their fighting men, the right arm of the October Egypt--the Egypt of peace. They are building the edifice of our armed forces upon modern electronics and technological specialists and education. As the combat experts say, it is a more difficult mission than combat itself, demanding constant effort.

Who are these commanders who have assumed their new commands?

At the Egyptian armies' level, there is the change of command of the Third Army, from Staff Maj Gen Yusuf 'Afifi to Staff Maj Gen Qadri 'Uthman, two commanders from the Third Army, and especially from the glorious October war [where they fought] side by side.

Before we discuss the military career of the two men, let us turn to the new duties assumed by Maj Gen Yusuf 'Afifi, until 5 Jan 1980 the commander of the Third Army. These consist of the post of assistant minister of defense and the chairmanship of the Military Research Committee, which represents one of the major sources of nourishment for the scientific foundation of our armed forces, with ramifications in scientific research, military sciences, and the creativity of the brilliant Egyptian intellect, in addition to the study of modern Eastern and Western weaponry.

Maj Gen Yusuf 'Afifi was born in Shibin al-Qanatir in 1927. He graduated from the War College in 1948. Since his graduation as an officer, he had fought with military field formations, fighting in the first round in Palestine, and then in the rounds of 1956 and 1967. In the 1967 war, Yusuf 'Afifi, with the infantry battalion which he commanded, achieved some tactical successes which confirmed the steadfastness and ability of the Egyptian combatant. However, these good results were lost in the clouds of the final outcome of that unfortunate round.



Maj Gen Yusuf 'Afifi--Assistant minister of war and chairman of the Military Research Committee

The highest political and military leadership, following the defeat of 1967, decided to discharge several of the most capable Egyptian army officers, for the purpose of ensuring authority and because they were part of the "Shams Badran Group," the minister of war until June 1967. Among the officers was Lt Gen Ahmad Badawi, chief-of-staff of our armed forces, and Maj Gen Yusuf 'Afifi, now the assistant minister of war.

After May 1971, President Sadat reinstated most of these commanders to the armed forces, in preparation for the war of liberation. Both Ahmad Badawi and Yusuf 'Afifi plunged into the October 1973 war, the first as commander of the Seventh Infantry Division, and the second as commander of the 19th Infantry Division, both divisions of the heroic Third Army. The men fought their immortal battles in the 100-day war, beginning 6 October 1973 and ending with the clearing of "the gap" and the period they called "disengagement." During this, President Sadat entrusted command of the "Badr forces" which later became the Third Field Army, to Ahmad Badawi and appointed Yusuf 'Afifi to the armed forces Operations Branch.

Lt Gen Ahmad Badawi fought in the October war as commander of the Seventh Infantry Division. The Division's chief-of-staff was Qadri 'Uthman, who was appointed commander of the Third Army in January 1980.



Lt Gen Ahmad Badawi, chief-of-staff, and next to him  
Maj Gen Qadri 'Uthman, new commander of the Third Army

Maj Gen Qadri 'Uthman Badr, born in al-Daqahliyah [Governorate] in 1937, graduated from the War College in 1952, a short while before the July revolution



## Commander of the Second Army

Before the end of last year, 1979, Maj Gen (Infantry) 'Abd Rabb al-Nabi Hafiz, commander of the Second Army, handed over the Army's command to Maj Gen (Armor) Ibrahim al-'Urabi, in order that Staff Maj Gen 'Abd Rabb al-Nabi could assume the post of chief of operations of our armed forces.



Maj Gen 'Abd Rabb al-Nabi Hafiz Receiving his comrades' congratulations

He was born in the Bab al-Sha'riyah Quarter [in Cairo].

Maj Gen 'Abd Rabb al-Nabi Hafiz graduated from the War College in 1949 and began his military career as an infantry soldier in al-'Arish in 1950. He took part in the battles of 56 and 67, and had a prominent role in the war of attrition (1969-70). He then assumed command of the 16th Infantry Division, one of the Second Army's divisions, in 1971. He and his division plunged into the Ramadhan war, during which he was wounded as he was leading his troops. At the end of June 1978, he was given command of the Second Army, while Maj Gen (Armor) Ibrahim al-'Urabi assumed the post of the Army's chief-of-staff, and then subsequently its command on 6 December 1979.

Maj Gen Ibrahim al-'Urabi was born in al-Daqahliyah [Governorate] in 1931, and graduated from the War College in 1950. As a junior first lieutenant, he joined the secret revolutionary cells in the Egyptian army and carried out his duty on the night of the revolution along side the free officers in the Armored Corps.




Maj Gen Ibrahim al-'Urabi, new commander of the Second Army

Ibrahim al-'Urabi was removed from command after the 1967 defeat, despite his known military competence, but was reinstated in the armed forces in 1971. He participated in the glorious Ramadhan October war with the fighters of the Egyptian tank [corps] which registered the most prominent tank battles in the military history of modern major armies. They surpassed in size and fatalities the tank battles of al-'Alamayn during the Second World War.

#### Air Defense Command

We shall turn now from the Egyptian armies and their commanders to the air defense forces, which engaged in heroic, bloody struggle from 1967 until after the October 1973 war, so that we can meet their new commander, Maj Gen al-Sayyid Hamdi, who has succeeded Lt Gen Hilmi 'Afifi Shangha'allah, who has urgently requested release from his post so that he can devote himself to medical treatment.

Maj Gen al-Sayyid Hamdi is a professor of air defense [science] and has made a brilliant reputation in stalking enemy aircraft, ever since he graduated from the War College in 1949. His class included Vice-Admiral Muhammad 'Ali, commander of our naval forces, Lt Gen Hasan Abu Sa'dah, the new ambassador of Egypt to London, and Maj Gen 'Abd Ra'ib al-Nabi Hafiz, our armed forces chief of operations.



**Maj Gen al-Sayyid Hamdi, new commander of the air defense forces**

He was born in Cairo in 1927, and before and during the war of attrition, he was deputy chief of the Combat Training Branch, Missiles and Electronic Anti-Aircraft Artillery. The chief of that branch at that critical period in our history was Lt Gen Hilmi 'Afifi, later commander of the air defense forces, may God be with him.

The AAA professor, Maj Gen al-Sayyid Hamdi, during the Seventies, occupied various military field leadership positions in combat organizations. His heroic role in the glorious Ramadhan October war led to his being appointed chief-of-staff of the air defense forces in mid 1979, and last December he assumed command, command of the Egyptian arm poised day and night to protect the country's skies, capable and alert, with a variety of sources of both Western and Eastern weapons, and with personnel applying themselves to a new phase among the most complex electronic or sophisticated scientific combat equipment.

**Secretariat of the Defense Ministry**

At the ministry of defense, we note the paratrooper, member of the airborne forces, one of the heroes and commanders of the Ramadhan war, throughout the

100 days, ending with the clearing of the gap west of the Canal, who was appointed to the secretariat-general of the defense ministry. This is a leadership job with diverse and critical dimensions, closely linked to the general leadership duties of the armed forces, led by the minister of defense and the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces.

Maj Gen Mahmud 'Abdullah was born in 1931 and graduated from the War College in 1952, as an infantryman. He took part in all the battles of the Sixties,



Maj Gen Mahmud 'Abdullah, secretary general of the ministry of defense

until he assumed command of the paratroops in the early Seventies. His men, in the October war, were the ones who carried out that huge human blockade that the Israeli tanks coming from their tactical and reserve positions encountered deep in the Sinai. The Egyptian paratroops' attack was made during the day of 6 October along with the first human waves of infantry and special commando forces, a superior historic operation. The paratroops commanded by the hero, Maj Gen Mahmud 'Abdullah, were able to destroy 155 Israeli tanks during the first 3 days of the glorious war. They continued to fight along side the Third Army forces and the Second Army forces in the southern and northern Sinai. They played a large part in the shooting down of Israeli aircraft with their small shoulder-held missiles--ground-to-air anti-aircraft missiles--in addition to other anti-tank and armor piercing missiles which they carried. Their combat was distinguished by brilliant

practical application of their training program received before the war, based on mobility coupled with quick assaults and excellent maneuverability which allowed them to encircle enemy forces. In the glorious war they gave their utmost for victory.

As a result, Maj Gen Nabil Shukri, commander of the Commando forces, has been named to the post of assistant chief-of-staff.

The former commando fighter was born in Cairo in 1931 and graduated from the War College in 1950. He served as an infantryman in Rafah and al-'Arish until 1954. He then joined the Egyptian paratroop corps which had been formed a year after the July revolution. He later went to America to take a commando course. When he returned to the country, he joined the commando forces whose nucleus had been established in 1955 in "Abu 'Agilah" in the Sinai. The late Field Marshal Ahmad Isma'il, when he was a colonel, commanded this nucleus before the 1956 war.



Maj Gen Nabil Shukri, assistant chief-of-staff

#### World of Plastics and Missiles

Before the series of military command transfers was over, a decree was issued appointing Staff Maj Gen Kamal Abu al-'Azayim as another assistant chief-of-staff.



Maj Gen Abu al-'Azayim is one of our armed forces' scientists. After his graduation from the College of Sciences with a bachelor degree in chemistry and geology in 1951, he joined the war industry. In 1953 he entered the War College among the first group of university youths to join the military. He left in 1954 in order to enter the Military Technical College and obtained a bachelor degree in mechanical engineering and a first class specialization diploma in "plastics and missiles." The plastics are of the advanced type used in the manufacture of modern missiles,

He went to England for further study, specializing in the chemistry of explosives and the manufacture of ammunition. Then he studied the iron and steel industry in West Germany. Scientific magazines have published various of his organic chemistry studies.

A humble and grateful salute to the men who have gone on, those who made the most costly sacrifice, who gave their lives for victory. They gave their lives so that we could live. And to the men who did their utmost and who have passed on the flag, high on the pole, to their sons of the October generation. Many of them are fighting disease after long, extended service, during which they gave the best years of their lives to our armed forces, out of loyalty and love, silently, far from the lights.

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## EGYPT'S MILITARY POLICIES DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 1 Feb 80 pp 12-15

[Interview with General Kamal Hasan 'Ali, Minister of Defense, by Fumayl Labib: "Egypt Supports Arab Military Power Despite Political Disputes"]

[Text] Historic and shining days! Sinai is liberated, the mountain passes are ours. The land, dyed with martyrs' blood, has been returned; our flags overfly it. Festive days, and the words of Gen Kamal Hasan 'Ali, the minister of defense, have ignited the light through which the truth shines, at a time in which deceit and Red dangers abound around the sacred Arab lands. Our armed forces stand guard; they alone are the sentry.

### Liberation Celebrations

His voice was calm and his cadences measured. Gen Kamal Hasan 'Ali, the minister of defense, said:

"These are great days. The Sinai is liberated; 80 percent of it has been restored to us without bloodshed. How many martyres would it have cost us were we to have liberated it by fighting! We are fighting men; we know the measure of blood and sweat it would demand. When President Anwar Sadat achieved this liberation for us through diplomacy and regained the land without bloodshed, he gave to the Egyptian mother and the Egyptian father a most precious gift. Every mother who has lost her son knows this, and every father who has a martyr in the Sinai knows it.'

He then said:

"You ask me what the significance is of the first stage of the withdrawal. I say to you that it is a five-part withdrawal stage, and in its totality, represents Egypt's restoration to sovereignty over the most important economic and strategic areas in the Sinai, from a defensive point of view. As regards the economic aspect, we have regained the oil wells on the coast of the Gulf of Suez, the manganese and phosphate mines, and the coal

mines in Jabal Mugharah. We have regained the fishing resources in al-Bardwil and along the coasts of the Red and Mediterranean Seas, and the tourist areas of St. Catherine's and al-'Arish. Then there are the mountain passes which are considered the main line of defense in the Sinai, to defend Egypt from the northeast."

[Question] And the next stage?

[Answer] The second withdrawal stage extends over 2 years. When completed, it will reach Egypt's international border with Palestine under the British mandate. This will be done within a period of from 1 year, 3 months to 2 years. We would like it to be completed in the least amount of time possible. I will go to Israel during the second half of February to begin negotiations with Ezer Weizman, the Israeli defense minister, to lay out the broad outlines of principles, the plans for the subsequent withdrawal, and its approximate time-table during the next phase.

[Question] What was the purpose of the Israeli defense minister's visit to Cairo last week?

[Answer] To reach agreement on certain final points regarding the current withdrawal, i.e., the one which we have concluded, and on what actions will follow by the joint committee which will continue to work until the final withdrawal is completed. There will be patrols along the lines in the present demilitarized zone. Agreement had been reached in Washington with Vance, Dayan and Ezer on the establishment of Egyptian and Israeli observation points and inspections. I mean, not Egyptian-Israeli, but rather Egyptian and Israeli in the combined demilitarized zone from east of the al-'Arish-Ras Muhammad line with a width of five km. Agreement was also reached in Washington on the composition of personnel of the American warning station to keep "A" zone under surveillance. This is the zone east of the Canal, and the purpose is to make sure that the size of forces does not exceed what is prescribed in the Egyptian-Israeli agreement. This is the American role in the Sinai now. Additionally, the Americans will carry out air surveillance flights every week over zones "A" and "B." The latter zone is located east of zone "A" up to the al-'Arish-Ras Muhammad line.

[Question] Now, the first stage of withdrawal has ended. What has been the Israeli attitude toward implementation?

[Answer] Israel was obligated to that which it was bound by. The military establishment has responded with loyalty, as it must do.

[Question] Without any sabotage?

[Answer] Without the least bit of sabotage!

[Question] What is the story of the fire, which grew at the hands of youths until the armed forces intervened, and spread from Wadi al-Akhhdhar to the reclaimed land and the valuable passes?

[Answer] Liberation celebrations are not property of armed forces only. They were the celebrations of all the people, represented by their youth. The fire symbolized the celebration of liberation. The dawn has risen over our valuable territory which had lived in shadows, but the event merits a fire and its light.

### The Coming Danger!

[Question] However, the liberation celebrations are mixed up with the coming danger. This danger arises out of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, their presence in South Yemen, and their maneuvers in the Arab lands.

[Answer] Before the Egyptian-Israeli peace accords, we faced no enemy except Israel. No sooner had the accords moved toward implementation than we saw the dangers begin to encircle the area as a whole. These dangers burden us with great responsibilities. These dangers emphasize the role of armed forces in peacetime. I say this to those who believe or hope that the armed forces will discharge groups of troops or officers, or that it will begin to relax. The tasks of the coming stage are vast, prodigious. We must be prepared for them.

The minister went on to say:

The direct danger to our area is Communism. Our armed forces do not intervene in battles within the Arab region, but if Communism threatens Arab territory, we face a sacred duty.

[Question] They said about us that we had intervened in the war between Morocco and the Polisario, or to be more precise, in the war between Morocco and Algeria.

[Answer] Morocco requested military assistance, and we responded because its enemy was within its territory. The same principle could be applied to any other nation. Our assistance to Morocco was arms and ammunition. What we did was a literal application of the Arab collective security treaty, which provides for assistance to any Arab state whenever that is requested. We will give assistance in light of the type of threat and its size, and, in light of this state or that, we will offer our assistance in type and quantity. We are ready to accede to any request made of us.

Our precept is that we shall not intervene in internal struggles, because if we were to do so, we would weaken one or another of us. We would then become a tasty morsel for the coming peril, or the unexpected peril.

### These Are National Duties!

[Question] What is the goal of this danger?

[Answer] The Soviets want to encircle the sources of oil and reach the warm waters. This is the old Czarist theory, and under cover of ideology, they are trying to destroy the Arab world. The value of the Arab region is the oil which extends along its shores in the warm waters. Therefore, it is the feverish goal of the Soviet Union after Afghanistan; we must be prepared to carry out our national duties to protect Arab soil.

[Question] They say that we have 25,000 troops in Oman?

[Answer] They say--forget what they say! The fact is we have no military forces in Oman. However, if Oman were to request any assistance, we would be prepared for that. I said that this is a national duty.

[Question] Regarding the recent events in Saud Arabia, was assistance in the form of Egyptian armed forces requested?

[Answer] No, this did not occur.

[Question] But the danger to certain Arab states might be more rapid than the arrival of our forces there.

[Answer] The Egyptian armed forces have sufficient ability to move forward on any urgent request of any Arab country. The air bridge only takes a few hours to reach all parts of the Arab Nation.

[Question] But the Arabs are boycotting us. They say they have isolated us. Some of them do not hesitate to charge us with treason. Our image abroad portrays us to the world as fighting each other at every sunrise. So how can the Egyptian armed forces carry out their national duty in this climate?

[Answer] Despite the political disputes which you mention, and for which there is no reason, there is a kind of military bond between Egypt and most of these nations. They are ties which cannot be severed. Egypt will spare no effort to bolster the military capabilities of these nations, no matter how much the political positions may differ.

[Question] The Soviet menace is about to surround the Arabs, and for some weeks past, Khomayni's threats to occupy Bahrain or some other Gulf nation have been heated and menacing.

[Answer] We have an openly stated policy regarding this. Those who threaten the Gulf states threaten the entire Arab being. We shall protect the Gulf states against any danger. We shall oppose anyone who says that Bahrain belongs to them. Our positions are public and firm, because they are based on our unswerving principles.

[Question] In the face of these perils, have our armed forces found themselves in a state of combat, suddenly?



[Answer] This is true.

No Alliances, No Bases!!

He went on to say:

The vice-president of the republic, Husni Mubarak, said after his return from a five-state tour, including his successful stop in the United States of America, that in compliance with the Egyptian armed forces' requirements, three goals must be achieved:

1. Replacement of the Soviet arms which have become obsolete;
2. Bolstering Egypt's defensive capability; and,
3. Bolstering the combat capability to enable Egypt to carry out its Arab, national obligations.

[Question] Has the United States acceded to our arms request?

[Answer] Before we agreed on weapons, \$1.5 billion was earmarked for 3 years, which will end at the end of 1981. It was increased by \$350 million, along with a fixed amount of \$800 million annually, beginning in 1981. These are indicators, which are given considerable value, and I stress the term "considerable." The important factor in all this is the speed with which we are supplied with the requested equipment and arms at the first possible opportunity. This importance will be the subject of our discussions when the American undersecretary of defense visits us for negotiations.

[Question] Won't these loans burden our backs in the future? Won't they constitute a burden similar to the previous predicament with the Soviet Union?

[Answer] The American loans are easy loans; their interest rates are reasonable and begin after a 10 year grace period. I can tell you that we have obtained a similar basis of treatment as Israel, i.e., that everything which the United States applies in its loans and interest rates with Israel will be applicable in our dealings with the United States. I believe that this will ease things considerably, and that the loans or the deals with the United States will not cause any difficulty.

[Question] They say that we have granted bases to the Americans?

[Answer] Egypt is being subjected to a frenzied attack by its enemies. This was a report which a news agency slipped in, and we issued a denial an hour after it was broadcast. We will not give our bases to anyone. Egypt has always been aloof from allies. A quarter century ago, it rejected CENTO and the Eisenhower doctrine. We kept to this understanding of ours in our dealings with the soviets, we rejected giving bases to the Soviets. However,

it did happen that they overstepped this understanding in their relationship with Egypt, and with their position with respect to the state of cold war, they tried to obtain bases. Their attempts were opposed by President Anwar Sadat, and he expelled 17,000 Soviet experts in a week.

Egypt's policy is no base for anyone. This is what guarantees us our freedom of will and freedom of decision. We suffered under British bases in Egypt for 80 years.

Facilities and Experts!

[Question] What's the story about facilities?

[Answer] Our strategic position in the region makes it suitable at this stage, and for the security and stability of the region, to grant certain facilities to the United States at certain airbases when necessary. This is all there is to it. The Americans have not asked to obtain bases. If they ask, we will only offer facilities.

[Question] Facilities is a flexible word. I would like a definition.

[Answer] Facilities to overfly Egyptian territory, to land at agreed upon airbases or naval bases in order to refuel or transport wounded. These facilities are not indefinite, and all equipment supplied to these air and naval bases would become the property of Egypt afterwards.

[Question] Some reports say that American experts in Egypt number in the thousands.

The Minister laughed.

[Answer] We have started along the path of peace; there is no turning back. Some rulers have taken the path of deceitful reports, and they will not turn back! Let me explain to you our general policy with nations from which we receive arms, including the United States. After this, you can make a judgement in a second on those fictitious reports.

We have our qualified instructors obtain the necessary expertise from the arms-producing country. They then are prepared to train the officers and teams. In our estimation, this is the best way to remedy two things:

--the language difficulties for all ranks, on the one hand; and reduction of the costs of these missions to the lowest possible degree.

More than a year ago, you published a conversation in AL-MUSAWWAR that I had with the Americans [about the fact that] they are preparing a training program especially for Egyptians. At that time I said: "The Egyptians are making progress; they are learning quickly and understand a great deal." The Egyptians are being trained in a period of no more than 10 weeks. There

are delegations of various nationalities who train in the language for 54 weeks. A similar period follows, beginning with the language and ending with the requested training material in 36 weeks. We sent out instructor-officers for training on the Phantom, and they completed the mission in 2 and one-half months, because they were completely conversant in the language, and they had a completely scientific background, in addition to acknowledged combat experience. Therefore, they were able to grasp very quickly the material given to them and were able to rapidly translate what they obtained into the language of their own country.

Therefore, the assistance of foreign experts is restricted to the narrowest limits, in operations of assembling the weapons and, whenever maintenance and repair experience is not available, we will seek the assistance of experts, because training on maintenance requires a longer period of time for engineers until they can acquire the ability to discover the damage, disconnect the parts and test them again, so that the repair will be 100 percent. This requires a very long time, and so, during this time, assistance is being sought from experts, experts who are coming in limited numbers and who will stay for a limited time.

#### Fighter Aircraft Being Produced!

[Question] What is in the recent American arms deal for Egypt?

[Answer] The deal includes two important elements; advanced F16 aircraft and M60 tanks, in addition to missiles, armored vehicles, and much other equipment required to arm the formations and units, from engineering to administrative aspects, in order to achieve a plan of action for the armed forces.

[Question] If we were to be surprised by war before the weapons were mastered, or in the military expression, before the change of doctrine, what would happen?

[Answer] The act of changing military doctrine goes on together with the arrival of the weapons from their new source. Re-arming any unit goes through stages of clearly defined and intense training. The differences between American and Soviet weapons consist in certain additional technical equipment, but from the standpoint of principle, they are considered the same, from the standpoint of principle in the weapon, they are one. The unit armed with American weapons could have a year to master them, because there are units which will continue with Soviet arms. Accordingly the majority of weapons will be American within 5 years, unless some of the units, such as the Air Force, are quicker in changing over to Western arms than any of the other main forces in the armed forces. This will not inconvenience us, so long as we continue to have a continuous and clear plan for managing spare parts for the Soviet and Eastern arms, in general, far from the Soviet Union.

[Question] We declared a diversity of arms sources and now it is almost purely America?

[Answer] We have many weapons from Western Europe; we have received them over the past 5 years. We are still obtaining them from Western Europe. The best example of that is the Swingfire anti-tank missile, which the Arab Organization for Industrialization produces. It is a British weapon. Mirage aircraft; the Seakin aircraft, made especially for naval use, is English. The commando helicopter and the French Gazelle helicopter, which is anti-tank. The examples of weapons which we import from Western Europe are numerous.

[Question] Do you consider it a little negative that the armed forces' weaponry is diversified?

[Answer] Military planning should be proficient in exploiting all weaponry that it has. Military planning should take into account the correct weapon in the correct situation and the appropriate mission. Diversification of weapons can result in some additional, administrative burdens, but with sound planning, all of this can be accomplished as desired with the most appropriate methods.

#### The Red Peril!

[Question] Apropos of what you mentioned regarding the Swingfire missile which the Arab Organization for Industrialization is producing, what is the latest Organization news?

[Answer] The factories were our factories, the technicians are our sons. Therefore, everything has continued as before. The wheel has not been stopped. The Arab national participating in the Industrial Organization wanted to liquidate the organization. We said no. We said that the positions of the three nations in the organization should be clarified. As for the organization, it remains.

Accordingly, these nations bear the responsibility for cancelling the contracts with the European countries, which had contracted with it, and bear the moral responsibility toward both England and France regarding the signed protocols. The Egyptian position regarding the Arab Organization for Industrialization was completely sound and was a noble and just position. What we did was to freeze the organization's assets abroad, pending clarification of the nations' positions. At the same time, the assets here are Egyptian ministry of defense assets for the most part. Therefore, the ministry must safeguard them on behalf of what the Industrialization Organization produces for the Egyptian armed forces.

[Question] Has the United States submitted any bids to support this organization?

[Answer] We have American bids for financing the production of helicopters, and we also have bids from other countries. Study is now underway on all this. The reason for financing bids aimed at the production of helicopters is that the project of producing helicopters is the only one which has been

stopped in the Organization for Industrialization. Our contacts with the United States in this regard are being extended to include production of a jet fighter, such as the F-S-1, or a helicopter.

Egypt is proceeding along its path. Its armed forces are prepared to bear their responsibilities. These forces are undergoing arduous training in order to master their new weapons and combat doctrine, because they recognize that the dangers are many and their duties numerous. Peace began with the Sinai's liberation, but the greatest danger is advancing against the Arab land, and a powerful bell is ringing out in the entire Arab region.

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EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSE, PAST AND PRESENT, DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 8 Feb 80 pp 24-26

[Interview with Maj Gen al-Sayyid Hamdi, the new air defense commander, by Hamdi Lutfi: "Why Will Our Duties be More Difficult in Peace than War? French Missiles Added to our Armaments. Laser Beams, a Very Advanced Weapon in Future Aerial Combat, But 'Smoke' Affects Efficiency!"]

[Text] The performance of the Egyptian air defense forces and the cost of their sacrifices will be remembered; generations to come will sing their praises.

Our air defense forces stirred the souls of the Egyptian people and gave them hope during the war of attrition 1969-1970. They worked hard setting up anti-aircraft missile bases and fighting at the same time. Their services continued after the glorious Ramadhan October war in 1973 until today--and tomorrow. Protecting the country's skies is a national duty which never ceases even when the fighting stops or peace is established. The air defense men have remained fully vigilant day and night following the war, protecting Egypt's skies and the glorious October victory. It is vigilance coupled with excellent training on the most modern electronic equipment and raising their skills to the highest standards of efficiency. This vigilance as well as the training program should be developed in an even bigger and more effective way in peacetime than in stages of war preparation or when forces begin combat operations.

Since before World War II, circumstances have caused the air defense forces, along with the rest of our armed forces, to apply a policy of diversified sources of arms. They used English weapons until after the July revolution of 1952, Russian weapons during the Sixties and French weapons toward the end of the Seventies.

In our conversation with the professor of Egyptian air defense, Maj Gen al-Sayyid Hamdi, one of the heroes and commanders of the October war, and the new commander of our air defense forces, I used the story of weapons from diverse nationalities as an opening to the conversation with him.

[Question] The Egyptian air defense forces have added French weapons to their Eastern armaments and previous Western arms. Since English artillery was used and achieved heroic field excellence beginning with World War II and ending with the October 1973 war, what was "the beginning and climate" in which the first nucleus of weapons, the first squadron of AAA men and searchlights appeared?

[Answer] The formation of the first nucleus of Egyptian AAA began in 1938, when the first AAA regiment was formed, armed with 3-inch guns left over from WWI. Then the second 3-inch regiment was formed, two searchlight batteries equipped with 90 cm searchlight projectors, also left over from WWI.

At this time Italy had attacked and occupied Ethiopia. That resulted in Italian domination over the mouth of the Red Sea from Ethiopia, in addition to its rule over the Straits of Sicily and its domination over the central Mediterranean because of its presence in Libya.

All this forced England, "mistress of the seas" at that time, to work to oppose that Italian superiority. It began to help to strengthen the Egyptian army after the 1936 treaty, and as a result of the role of air power in the Ethiopian war, despite the fact that it was a new weapon which had not fully matured, the importance of creating an AAA force in Egypt, which could defend its principal cities and economic centers against any air attack, emerged. WWII did not slow up this newborn weapon, and thus it grew and intensified. WWII broke out in 1939, and the Egyptian AAA units had to oppose the air forces of the Axis nations and to protect Egypt's skies from their air raids. The Egyptian AAA units entered combat against Italian aircraft at first and achieved excellent results against them. However, the entry of German air power, with its advanced aircraft and trained pilots, put the Egyptian AAA units in a difficult position. Despite that, Egyptian AAA units, with hard, diligent and innovative training, were able to oppose the German aircraft and inflict tangible damages on them, in addition to their complete success in protecting the vital targets entrusted to them in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said against heavy and continuous attacks employing up to 100 aircraft and raids lasting from 6 to 8 hours. With the end of WWII, radar had been introduced into service with these units, and it became necessary to train AAA officers in all scientific developments in this field.

In fact, a number of instructional courses were sent to the British AAA school in the Middle East, where Egyptian officers demonstrated their outstanding ability to grasp scientific development to an amazing degree.

It is appropriate that I mention here that this generation of junior officers at that time was the same generation of air defense commanders during the glorious October war.

[Question] There is a saying repeated in some world missile and space magazines that it had been practically proved after the October 1973 war that

there was a need for major changes in the use of airborne electronic counter-measures against ground-missile aid defense. That came about after military operations in the October war revealed that the counter-electronic capabilities carried by the aircraft cost enormous amounts, and that it was possible to weaken their effectiveness by means of the ground personnel. What is your view of this statement? What do you predict the forms of these airborne measures will be, and those countering them whether on the ground or airborne?

[Answer] Airborne electronic equipment is all radar, radio, and electro-optical gear which fighter aircraft carry for the purpose of reconnaissance and guidance, as well as aiming, bombing and jamming. Thus they are the means of protecting the aircraft from air defense missiles until it reaches the target. This is considered the main decisive factor in preferring one airplane over another and is the basis of the scientific struggle currently going on between East and West. The B-55 American reconnaissance aircraft has been modified more than five times with the difference between one model and another being merely the scope of its electronic gear.

The best example we encountered in the October 73 war was the extent of the electronic capabilities which the Phantom aircraft enjoyed, and how air defense and electronic warfare personnel countered it.


This aircraft was equipped with the electronic reconnaissance system, A-B-R-36-37, which enabled it to determine the type of radar which has detected it as soon as it begins to operate, to determine the start of the missiles' radar station and to warn the pilot as soon as the missile is fired.

At this point the pilot operates his electronic maneuvering system, because of which the missile cannot hit the plane, since it increases the sharpness of the plane's maneuvers against the missile's maneuvers.

As soon as the air defense personnel began to appreciate the situation, they obtained definite results which caused the Israeli pilot to lose confidence in this equipment. The decision was rapid and conclusive, and it was a lesson which will not be forgotten.

This aircraft was also equipped with the most modern radar for reconnaissance and aiming (Radar A-B-KYW 120) which can accomplish radar and television reconnaissance, and automatic bombing and aiming, with the assistance of electronic computers. The response in electronic warfare methods in air defense was harsh and rigorous. Jamming these radars was accomplished. The screen became so bright that all outlines of the desired targets were obliterated, or rather, men created new means of deception, so that the target appeared on the radar screen more than once and in different places, which finally forced the pilot to shut down the equipment and operate visually. This aircraft was also equipped with radio systems to guide the plane closer to the target. However, ground-based electronic warfare methods were responsible for silencing this equipment and ruining its efficiency. The Phantom was also supplied with chaff containers in order

to neutralize and confuse our ground radars and missile stations. Immediately, the warning system and missile guidance radars were supplied in small units [possible omission] which enabled them to operate efficiently under circumstances of hostile jamming.



Maj Gen al-Sayyid Hamdi

In this area, we cannot fail to mention the enemy's use of pilotless guided aircraft, and how they were countered. And here we come to the role of the heroic air defensemen, of whom the president said in his speech, "The equipment with its men, not the men with equipment."

In light of what was previously explained about the effectiveness of electronic countermeasures created by air defense to reduce and retard the effectiveness of airborne electronic gear which cost vast amounts, these measures have become the object of high level study in world military academies.

I predict continuous and increased struggle and competition between airborne electronic methods and air defense countermeasures. The basic distinction in this struggle is the vast expense required for airborne electronic systems as opposed to their counterparts, which are the electronic countermeasure systems located on the ground. The latter are much cheaper because they depend on men's brains in using the equipment and making advances with it. This is the value of our men's brains; it is a priceless value comparable only with the glorious victory of October 1973.



## America and the French Missiles

[Question] Are you of the same opinion, as expressed by some commanders in the world, that in the future, air defense will be confined to aircraft and whatever weapons they carry against hostile aircraft, or that ground formations will certainly remain and play an evolving role, despite the gigantic differences in modern, scientific capabilities which aircraft possess, an extraordinary growth, and the fact that development of anti-aircraft missiles is not keeping pace with developments in aviation?

[Answer] Air defense, since its inception and up to now, is a term for a group of diverse actions to prevent the air enemy from having an effect on our vital targets. Air and ground systems both have a place in these actions, because both have their own potential, capabilities, and qualifications. It is impossible to dispense with one system or the other. However, from time to time, some extreme views appear, based on combat experiences. The truth is that combat experiences in different battles might play up the importance of one of the methods as compared to another method, but that occurs in a specific theater of operations and within the limits of specified political and military circumstances. In the 1967 war, in the war of attrition up to 1970, and as a result of the Israeli air force superiority, military analysts in the West adopted a theory that air defense was surpassed by the use of fighters and that ground-based air defense systems were inadequate in air combat. But, after the June-July 1970 operations, in which Israeli aircraft were shot down by Egyptian missiles, and after the overwhelming success of Egyptian air defense in the 1973 October war, in protecting our ground forces and preventing Israeli aircraft from having any influence over the course of land battles basically by the use of ground-based systems, the West began to wake up to the importance of these systems. This caused the chief-of-staff of the German armed forces to declare after the October war that, "The important factor in this war was the theories of air defense after Israel had sustained heavy losses in aircraft during the first days of the war." It is worth noting that research efforts in the United States, after the 73 war, began to concentrate both on weakening hostile air defense and reducing its effectiveness without entering into direct confrontations with it, and additionally, on strengthening American ground-based air defense. Every nation in the West and East that produces weapons has followed that example. As regards the first aspect, we find increased concentration on developing air/ground electronic jamming equipment, warning systems on aircraft, the use of missiles guided by television, lasers and radio, and the development of pilotless drones to perform several tasks against air defense, and also the use of suppression weapons of various kinds. All of this is for the purpose of reducing the effectiveness of hostile ground-based air defense systems. On the other hand, the development of American anti-aircraft missiles which possess tremendous possibilities, the production of advanced American anti-aircraft missiles, the research underway to produce new, effective types of AAA guns, America's choice of the Franco-German "Roland" missile for production in the United States to fill the gap which presently exists in the American ground-based air defense systems, all of this emphasizes the extent of American



military strategic sensitivity to the importance of ground-based air defense methods.

However, all that does not mean that ground methods can manage without fighter aircraft. The fighter is still the most important means of air defense and the most versatile. I think the important thing for each nation, according to its own circumstances, is to define the required ratio of these two types, in order to achieve the necessary balance in establishing an air defense system capable of carrying out its duties to protect the nation's skies from any air attack.

#### Egyptian Doctrine Between East and West

[Question] There is a view that says that every development added to weapons and equipment requires a change in tactics, or rather in drawing up military strategy. This is a very costly matter. When we look at our air defense forces, we find that since 1955 they have been involved with Eastern weapons and Eastern combat doctrine. When we come to the end of the Seventies, we find them pursuing operations on the principle of diverse sources of arms. We are turning to the use of Western arms. Does not this situation require a long time for us to reach the stage of the trained soldier of the new generation, or is reversing to a different position just a matter of practical application in our defense forces?

[Answer] We in Egypt do not follow an Eastern or a Western combat doctrine; we only follow an Egyptian combat doctrine. I don't mean by that to diminish the value of combat doctrines which the super powers, America and Russia, offer. Undoubtedly the combat doctrine is tied to a considerable extent to the types and capabilities of the weapons used. That makes it necessary for us to adopt some of the armsmaker's combat doctrine, but it does not force us to adopt everything in this doctrine or to completely adopt it to the letter.

In addition to military doctrine being tied to weapons, it also, to a considerable extent, is dependent upon other local factors, such as the type of soldier, the nature of the terrain, the nature and circumstances of the expected battle, and the type and size of the anticipated threat.

In our circumstances here in Egypt, in the period from 1967 to 1973, we were able to adapt the Eastern doctrine to the circumstances and requirements of the Egyptian armed forces and the nature of its expected battle, which led to the success achieved in the October 73 war. Thus it could be said that we used an Egyptian military doctrine in this war based on the use of Eastern equipment.

By the same standard, the use of Western equipment in Egypt will lead to the development of Egyptian military doctrine compatible with the capabilities and potentialities of these weapons. The fact is that we, to the same extent, will develop our own tactics and combat methods. We shall also develop our

present and future weapons, so that they are compatible with these tactics and methods. The subject of doctrine is not a one-sided game, but it is a multi-sided game. With our experiences gained from the war of attrition and the October war battles, we can hold a considerable number of cards in our own hands, not in other hands.

### Smoke Affects Lasers

[Question] How would you describe the role of lasers in combat which has not yet occurred, in battles between aircraft, and the methods of shooting them down? After we have lived through the age of the television bomb in the Ramadhan war, this bomb has tremendous possibilities. It has been said that it can neutralize or destroy any weapon on the ground from long distances, with its aircraft secure from missiles!

[Answer] It is always useful to remember that aerial warfare, or the battle between the means of air attack and the means of air defense, has always used the most modern scientific devices and technological advances. This scientific and technological race between the means of air attack and defense will continue to exist for a long time. In the Ramadhan war, both sides used everything they had in terms of scientific and technical potential to counter the methods, arms, and capabilities of the other side. In countering the wall of Egyptian missiles on the Canal front, it was necessary for the Israeli Air Force to use all the means it could to reduce the effectiveness of this wall and also to protect itself from its accurate fire. They used electronic jammers and distortion devices from their various sources. Also, anti-radar missiles were used, fired from aircraft to destroy the sources of radar pulses in the Egyptian wall of missiles. Because these methods were unsuccessful, pilotless drones and television guided weapons, such as "Walleye" and "Maverick," were used. These weapons have a very high degree of accuracy in hitting small targets with direct hits from great distances, which protected the attacking aircraft from anti-aircraft missile fire. However, the Egyptian air defense personnel in the Ramadhan war were able to reduce the effectiveness of these weapons, forcing the Israeli pilots to penetrate within range of the missiles.

Regarding the role of lasers in aerial warfare in the future, it is expected that lasers will play a big role in this warfare as a means of defining the target with a high degree of accuracy from a long distance, just as radar had played, and still plays, the main role in aerial warfare. Lasers are distinguished by a degree of accuracy far surpassing the accuracy of radar equipment. But it does have certain shortcomings and limitations, such as the effect of atmospheric conditions and smoke on its efficiency, as opposed to radar which is not affected by these factors.

In general, the future aerial war battle will see a great advance in practical usage of science's various achievements by both sides, whether that be the use of laser beams or the use of any other achievement of this kind.

## The Truth Is What the Enemy Has Seen!

[Question] Permit me to ask: What were the decisive points of change in our air defense rounds with Israel, beginning with 1948, pausing to study the lessons from the 1967 defeat, dealing with the serious mistakes, and then continuing on to the October 1973 victory?

[Answer] Egyptian air defense plunged into the adversities of five rounds with the air enemy after World War II. It began in 1948 when the superiority of the AAA units over the Israeli air power was such that they were assigned to give assistance to the ground forces, in addition to the duties of aerial protection. They were used as anti-tank artillery and field artillery, and we still recall the battle of al-Tabbah 86, where the AAA units were able to stop the foe, inflicting heavy losses, which prevented them from attacking al-Tabbah again. We still remember as well the martyred hero, Lt 'Abd al-Hamid Abu Zayd, who with two 40 mm guns was able to stop an Israeli armored attack from enflanking and surrounding al-'Arish. He was able to inflict such heavy damages that they were forced to withdraw without achieving their mission. Then the second round was in 1956 (following the Czech arms deal), and the men of the Egyptian air defense, who had only a few months of training and preparation, had to face the air forces of three nations, two of them major powers.

It was a tremendous test, during which Egyptian AAA units were able to achieve astonishing success, even though at the expense of martyrs' blood, and they emerged from it with valuable experience and lessons which have enabled them to develop much of their tactics and combat methods, leading to their being supplied with anti-aircraft missiles at the beginning of the Sixties. However, there was not enough time for the air defense units to master the new armaments, from the standpoint such as capability of the weaponry to a certain extent, as well as it not being conformable with the large development which had occurred in the Israeli air forces. Thus, the harsh lesson of 67 in which the Israeli air forces exploited the inadequacies and weaknesses in our air defense system and air forces. The most prominent of the lessons learned from the 1967 round:

The air defense system with its various components must be subordinate to one commander.

The Egyptian air defense system must be capable of opposing heavy air attacks from numerous directions, at low and very low altitudes, under conditions of hostile electronic jamming and deception. The air defense forces, about which a decree was issued establishing it as a fourth force in the Egyptian armed forces on 23 June 1969, was able to master these lessons, because it prepared itself, after a tenacious struggle with the Israeli air forces, to meet this challenge. This became apparent at the end of the war of attrition. In the period from 30 June 1970 to 8 August (the day of the cease-fire) the Israeli Air Force suffered significant losses which it did not like to admit, as a result of what was called the Egyptian wall of missiles along the Suez Canal.

I don't know whether to go on and talk about the fifth campaign, about the 1973 war, or whether all of its events and results are still engraved in our minds even today. However, I would like to recall to mind the statement of Moshe Dayan, the Israeli defense minister on 14 October on Israeli television, when he said: "The Israeli air forces are engaged in tenacious battles. It is a momentous war, with its days burdened with their blood."

The West talked about this war, when the American magazine, TIME, in its issue published on 24 January 1977, said: "The Egyptian forces, during the first week of the war, were able to use the first integrated missile system for air defense for the first time in history. Egyptian air defense, within a relatively short time, was able to shoot down 78 Israeli aircraft."

If we recall that most of these aircraft were of American manufacture, I need not proceed to enumerate the events and results of the war. But I shall only cite the proverb with says, "The truth is what the enemy has seen."

#### French Missiles!

[Question] Some of the world press has published a great deal of information about French ground-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, for example the Crotale, the Gafilute and Mazurka, and the air-to-ground anti-ground formation missiles, including the mainstays of air defense, the A-S-20, the A-S-30, and another missile, the Franco-Italian one called the A-S-30-L. Could we hear from you a little bit about these missiles' capabilities?

[Answer] The A-S-20 is a French air-to-ground missile launched from aircraft to strike at tactical ground targets. It is guided by radio commands and has a range of 5-6 km. Its production was stopped in view of the fact that the A-S-30 was developed and put into production as its replacement. The A-S-30 missile operates theoretically the same as the A-S-20, but its range is 10-12 km and its size is larger. It carries a warhead twice the weight of the A-S-20, which clearly raises its degree of explosive effectiveness against the target. Moreover the A-S-30 can be semi-automatically guided to the target from the aircraft which launches it, instead of manually as was the A-S-20. This missile's degree of accuracy is less than 10 meters.

As regards the A-S-30L, it is the same as the A-S-30, but with the addition of a laser beam guidance head in the missile and laser beam gear in the aircraft. Therefore, its degree of accuracy is considerably higher, which makes this missile have a high degree of efficiency for the destruction of tactical and small strategic targets, in the same degree as for large ones.

Concerning the types of air defense missiles which France produces, the various types are: long range, such as the Mazurka missile with a range of 40 km; medium range, including the Patrus missile, with a range of about 25 km; and short range, including the Crotale, 8.5 km, and the Roland (joint Franco-German missile) with a 6 km range. All these types are guided from land and sea to air against aircraft. There is a new type of non-guided missile, the Gafilute, which is based on scattering a large number of projectiles in the aircraft's line of flight, but this type has a very short range,



extending only 1500 meters, and is still in the experimental stage. [End of interview]

**Military Biography of Maj Gen Al-Sayyid Hamdi, Commander of the Egyptian Air Defense Forces**

\* Born Alexandria -- 6 May 1927

\* Graduated War College -- class of 1 February 1949

\* Occupied various levels of leadership posts, since graduation as an air defenseman, for example, command of an AAA battery, battalion, and regiment.

\* In 1959, supervised the establishment of a regiment with three battalions (AAA) on the Syrian front for a period of 170 days.

\* After returning home, he assumed command of an air defense missile brigade, then chief-of-staff of a division, and then its commander. He has also headed branches of operations, training, and reconnaissance for the AAA missile forces.

\* Later he was deputy chief, Combat Training Branch, HQ Air Defense, and then deputy chief, Missile and AAA Units. Lt Gen Hilmi 'Afifi, the previous commander of the air defense forces, was chief of these units.

\* He has had all the specialized courses for all levels of command in the air defense forces.

\* He assumed the post of chief-of-staff for the air defense forces in June 1979.

8 He was named commander of the forces on 12 December 1979.

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# AYATOLLAH MAHDAVI KANI DISCUSSES ABOLISHING KOMITEHS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 13 Feb 80 p 11

[Exclusive interview with Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, in charge of the komitehs in the country, by KEYHAN; date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [Question] With the election of the president, what will be the program of the Central Committee and the affiliated committees. Will they continue their work or would the responsibilities be transferred to another organ and organization?

[Answer] Until the parliament meets, the committees will obviously continue their work and later if the parliament finds it advisable, we will abolish the komitehs. Now what organ will accept the responsibilities of the komitehs, I should say that the parliament will vote for the disbandment of the komitehs when it has replaced them with an organization. Considering that the komitehs are one of the revolution's structures and that from the first day of revolution the members of the komitehs have been the arm of the revolution, and by taking their services throughout the country in the past and at present into consideration, especially that it has been very remarkable in Tehran to the point that even the pasdaran corps is not as active in city affairs as we are, if we feel that the corps and or the police stations could replace the komitehs, we will turn over the work to them.

[Question] Supposing the komitehs are disbanded shortly, what will be the status of the pasdaran?

[Answer] I said that I oppose the demolishing of the komitehs. However, if it was agreed to put the komitehs aside, we have one of the following two proposals for the gentlemen:

Those individuals who are qualified from the viewpoint of their age and other qualification to serve in the corps to be absorbed by the corps if that is what they want. And others, based on negotiations and agreements that we have had with the police department and also discussed at the Revolutionary Council to be absorbed by the police department if they so choose.

The members of the komitehs in the cities can join the gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic. This is for two reasons, first there is a manpower shortage in the gendarmerie and police force and secondly, it is necessary that the people be present in the gendarmerie and police department.

#### The Status of the Revolutionary Courts

[Question] When the president and the Islamic Republic Government start working, would the revolutionary courts continue with their work or would this duty be assigned to the Justice Department?

[Answer] This depends on the decisions of the parliament. Until the parliament sits, the courts will continue with their work. I believe that until our Justice Department has been revolutionized, we should not give the work of the revolutionary courts to that department.

[Question] What plans are under way by the Revolutionary Council to strengthen the police force?

[Answer] This is a question that Mr Rafsanjani, minister of interior, should answer.

To strengthen the police, we have stationed a group of pasdaran as the arm of the police in the police stations ever since the police resumed its work. Considering that the guards have stronger morale, we have tried to strengthen the morale of the police with the cooperation of these two organs. However, it is sometimes heard that some of the policemen consider the komiteh members troublesome, but it is not so and the goal of the pasdaran stationed in the police stations is to serve the people. And a policeman who considers himself a servant of society would obviously not consider the pasdaran troublesome. If any police station and policeman finds such a case, that is, an unrevolutionary act and an obstacle for their service, he should immediately report so that proper actions may be taken. However, so far no such a case has been reported to us. Now about armed criminals, I should say that we are not supposed to hand over a quiet country to the police to tell them: Here, Mr policeman work. The police should come to the scene and take action in the disarmament and arrest of criminals and accused. They should fight and bring peace. Otherwise when all is peaceful there is no need for police.

[Question] What actions have been taken regarding improving the salaries and benefits of the policemen?

[Answer] I should say that the matter has been discussed at present and it should be completed to be ready for implementation. However, the discrimination that exists in the army, police department and gendarmerie as regards ranks, that is not correct and it does not conform with the spirit of Islam. Part of the salary should be paid for work and not rank and as Islam has not considered salary for ranks, this matter should be taken

into consideration. And of course since former records of services are also taken into consideration for the question of rank, some remarkable value should also be placed for ranks. This is to avoid losing the enthusiastic aspects and taking action in continuing education and learning science and achieving practical and scientific positions. Nevertheless, the huge gaps in salaries of the policeman, NCO and officer is too much and in most cases it is not correct. For instance, there is a large gap between bonuses and premiums paid to an officer and a policeman going on a mission and this is not Islamic.

[Question] Have you made new decisions about public disarmament and how this plan would be carried out?

[Answer] The plan of public disarmament has been prepared at the Revolutionary Council and it will shortly be carried out.

At present, if we find an unauthorized weapon in anyone's hand we take it from him and interrogate that person. We have also warned the groups who take action in keeping and carrying arms illegally.

About some groups, we have taken actions such as the armed group of Mr Karubi. As you know we have disarmed his men. We will take action regarding others, too.

9044

CSO: 4906

# JURIST EXAMINES QUESTION OF PURGING GOVERNMENT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Feb 80 p 10

[Article by Seyyed Mohammad Asfari]

[Excerpt] You the owner; "...you should know that your worst counselors are those who have cooperated with rebels and plunderers and share in their sins and inhumane acts. Such men should not be among your close associates and friends. Because they are the friends and confidants of criminals and oppressors." (Excerpt from Nahjolbalagheh by Imam 'Ali)

## 1. Abu 'Ali Does Not Have What Abuzar Has

One of the current issues is surely the issue of purging government organizations and it can surely not be otherwise. The basics of instructions from The Koran are primarily based on purification.

Without a basic mental preparation, a healthy education will not be possible. According to Eqbal-e Lahuri: "When life changes, the world will change." In other words, in a contaminated and rotten atmosphere and environment, life will not have a chance to grow. See how the quiet atmosphere and the pure waves of desert are guided toward the clean nature of Abuzar, the same Jandab Ibn Janadeh. Bu Safa who touched the ground with his forehead for "Allah" before meeting Mohammad (peace be upon him) became the confidant of 'Ali, his friend and brother in the first step and became a believer. Yes, his pure and clean spirit was immediately absorbed by waves of reality. The late Professor Shari 'ati said: "What Abuzar has Abu 'Ali doesn't have! Abuzar's heart is pure and the grounds for its growth are such that they change to light and manifest light and glory. Based on this, every revolution requires purification and purging. Purging of those organs which have become sick. The improvement of organizations that have been affected with some type of cultural and social paralysis and the rust of long years covered their face unjustly. The rust of not knowing who they are and being alien to themselves, the rust of treacheries, plots, corruptions, and deceits, the rust of separation from self and one's culture. A long explanation is required to describe the consequences of such a separation and truly how can a revolution continue living on the same organs and standards, with the

same elements and materials with the same dies and old methods? Imagine a tired and wornout body, the brain orders but the nervous system hands and arms, etc....do not follow the instructions. Obviously such an unharmonized organism needs surgery. Otherwise with this disorderly, chaos and disobedience it will get nowhere but to death. If we accept the necessity for purification, the question is posed as to what the aim of purification is.

## 2. The Goal of Purging

In short, the aim is: To coordinate the executive revolutionary departments with ideology ruling it. We should do something so that the nervous system obeys the brain not only to obey but to be at its service wholeheartedly. We should make the atmosphere so pleasant that young twigs would have the opportunity to grow, talents would appear and human beings would regain their generosity. To act in such a manner that, contrary to the past, treachery, plundering, and mercenary actions would cause shame and humiliation, not a ladder of advancement. To create an atmosphere where standards would replace connections, efficiency and honesty would become the criteria for competency, justice would replace generosity and wildness, seeking personal interest would change to peace and serenity and, in short, those who, according to Amir Almomenin have sat on the top without any pain and hard work and have been promoted without deserving it would give up their snobbery and those who have been promoted without deserving it would give up their snobbery and those who have been placed in the lowest classes with all of their efforts and competency would move up and get their rights. To achieve this goal we need fundamental and deep purging [because there is the danger] it may be done superficially.

## 3. Superficial Purification

In such purging, the actions taken have mostly propaganda aspects. Some of the known elements who have already fled or who do not even dare to go to their office are either fired or retired by paying them substantial amounts of money. To be happy for nothing and deceive others and close the objecting mouths! Perhaps to explain our being and staying! With such a method what professional thieves and "embezzlers" get away from the hands of justice! And those who have been weak and oppressed will be trapped. In such a method, the angel of justice is blind and the law becomes a "cobweb" which traps the weak animals while the strong and wild ones tear up the tiny cobweb of law with thousands of conspiracies and plots and runaway. Or, unfortunately they appear this time as the friends of revolution. Why? Because his excellency has been educated abroad and is experienced and knows his manners. He never allowed himself to get trapped and if he worked with SAVAK, he worked honorarily. Yes, the same thief with light. In such a type of a so-called purification, the result of the board of purging would not be to clean the environment of undesirable elements, but it will find the role of a kind clergy who talks about pardoning, peace and "human rights" constantly and its work turns into baptizing.



His love for man arises and talks about Islamic favors for the same SAVAK member, that bestial creature who has sucked the people's blood for years, controlled the breathing of the liberal minded, left families without their breadwinners and, like a sly fox, secretly obtain secrets in order to increase the number of his report and get more money for selling himself. In the most cruel manner, he would hand over a wife and children to the torture so that he and his masters would easily indulge in fun and they would laugh at the innocent people. They would destroy the living of others so that they and their beloved ones could have a better life. Yes, he is unaware that it is not his right to give pardons in behalf of the victims of torture and those who were crippled. He is treading on the rights of those who lost their lives under the strokes of those executioners.

9044

CSO: 4906

## ESPIONAGE ALLEGATIONS PROLIFERATE

### Accusations Against FIC Firm

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Feb 80 p 12

[Text] Domestic and foreign managers of the FIC Co were American spies: From: Information and Research Department of the Guardians Corps, Vali-e-Asr operations headquarters. To: All the employees of the FIC Co and subcontractors.

According to documents obtained from FIC, with Mohammed Batmanqlich as its managing-director, the firm had signed exploitationist agreements with ITT (the maker of the coup d'etat in Chile and one of the biggest organs of the CIA) and then had began to carry out its colonialist plans through its American spies and hand-picked agents. We feel obliged to hereby reveal their identities along with their positions and the methods of their political spying.

Mr Hedayatollah Haj-Hakimi, deputy managing director of the FIC and deputy director in charge of the project.

In addition to having sent millions of dollars out of the country, Mr Hakimi is also accused of having cooperated actively with known American spies such as O'Keefe, about whom some documents have already been made public from the nest of the spies. He is also accused of cooperation with Hemmel [sic] who had been identified (as a spy) by revolutionary organs. Charges against him are very serious and the longer he hides himself the more serious the charges will become. He is being sought by agents of the revolutionary corps. Documents (concerning the accused) numbered 9, 22, 23, 14 and 15 are now available at the office of the prosecutor general of the revolution and the guardian corps.

Mr Ahmad Azimi Kazemi, FIC's financial manager:

He is accused of illegal siphoning off \$25 million to foreign banks for himself and his American and Iranian masters. He is also accused of having cooperated with American spies. He is also a fugitive and is being sought. Documents numbered 17, 20 and 3 are available at the offices of the prosecutor general of the revolution and the guardian corps.

FIC's Islamic coordinating council has submitted documents to KEYHAN denying the statement by the minister of post and telegraph in which the council had been accused of meddling in the management of the firm. The council believes that managers, who, through the FIC have siphoned millions of dollars out of the country while having been agents of ITT in Iran, should not be called trustworthy and respectable by the minister.

The council has submitted documents to KEYHAN in which treasons committed by the firm's managers have been described in detail. In a document prepared by the Information and Research Department of the guardian corps and submitted to KEYHAN by the council, it is claimed that all the foreign managers of the firm had been American intelligence agents who, while pretending to work for the firm, were actually engaged in the work of espionage, conducting psychological research for the purpose of implementing antidemonstration plans and transferring huge amounts of foreign exchange from the country.

According to the documents, foreign managers, in collusion with directors Mohammad and Bahman Batmanqlich and other Iranian managers including Hedayatollah Haj-Hakimi and Ahmad Azimi Kazemi, had concluded colonialist-type agreements with the ITT, the perpetrator of the Chilean coup d'etat, have been agents of the firm in Iran and have been carrying out espionage for it.

According to another document, one of the spies in FIC named William Campbell, working as a cable-laying specialist, had traveled to Kordestan at the height of the fighting there, pretending to be on leave, but actually for the purpose of preparing reports which were sent to the United States eventually. Another person named Romeo Manavato [sic] had been working on a project for the army and had been fed by the army intelligence and the SAVAK. Another employee, Ton O'Mally, a former FBI agent and an inspector of the firm, had been engaged in espionage work.

According to a report by the information and research department of the guardians corp, Mohammad and Bahman Batmanqlich, Hedayatollah Haj-Hakimi and Ahmad Azimi Kazemi, while having transferred millions of dollars overseas through the firm, are also accused of having been actively engaged in the work of the identified American spies in the FIC.

In its investigation report, the guardians corps writes: "Charges against these people are serious and the longer they stay in hiding the more serious they become." In another document, a man named Paul Kirby Vernon is identified as a veteran American spy who worked at the FIC as psychoanalyst for the U.S. Army Intelligence.

The Islamic coordinating council of the FIC believes that in view of the documents submitted to KEYHAN showing that managers of the firm had been spies, the statement by the minister of post and telegraph and his expression of support for them is worthless. The council is not a meddler and urges that the above-mentioned charges be investigated. Meanwhile, in a letter to radio and television, the person in charge of the firm, while denying the statement by the minister of post and telegraph, writes: It is not fair for the minister to blame the honorable and committed employees of this firm for the delay that has occurred in providing telephone applicants with new telephone lines.

#### Citations of U.S. Embassy Documents

Tehran SOBH-E-AZADEGAN in Persian 21 Feb 80 p 2

[Article: "Revelations by the Student Followers of the Imam's Line"]

[Text] In connection with the activities carried out at the nest of espionage in Iran and its plots aimed at the Islamic revolution, the student followers of the Imam's line have made public a number of documents the texts of which are as follows:

First document:

No 60-66

Date: 11 July

Reported by: Stemple [sic]

(It must be noted that Stemple and Tomseth [sic] are in the United States, and that Tomseth, who worked in the political section of the nest of the spies, is now holed up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is among the hostages of the Iranian people.)

Confidential:

From the U.S. Embassy in Tehran to the State Department:

Urgent:

Subject: A brief survey of the Forqan

1. Complete text for transmission.

2. An oldtime friend of the political officer, an old clergyman whose house last year was a center for ideological discussions by his students, gave a brief description of the Forqan group. Eleven of his former students are members of the group which numbers between 40 to 50. They are a combination of leftists and rightists but most are imbalanced individuals and, with the exception of a few, they believe in Islamic principles. They feel that it is only by terrorism that they can get rid of opposing clergies. A Forqan member was proud of the fact that they had decided to start their acts of terrorism by assassination of one clergyman a week and that it would be continued until final victory. The trouble is that they have not yet agreed as to what would be considered victory. The source said that the Forqan members with whom he is in touch have turned their attention to domestic targets and they do not seem to be interested in foreigners. He did not reject the possibility of the Forqan being connected with small Islamic groups. The group is centered in Tehran and is weak outside the city.

Document number two:

From: The U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

To: The State Department, Washington, D.C.

Subject: Request for assistance to organize militia (guerrillas) against the Islamic movement.

Reported by: Laingen, Tomseth and Shafer [sic].

1. Entirely confidential.

2. Briefly, on 8 August, Fereydu Afshar asked the embassy's political counsellor for assistance to organize a military force in Azerbaijan that could become useful in resisting the power of the Islamic movement. The counsellor rejected his request noting that U.S. policy was that of non-interference in domestic and internal affairs of Iran. Afshar gave an unexpected answer saying he was going to proceed with his plans. End of summary.

3. On 8 August, Afshar once again contacted the charge d'affaires asking for an appointment. The charge d'affaires believed he was Farid, the man Ramsey Clark had suggested a few weeks earlier that would visit him to discuss matters relating to the welfare of the (Iranian) Jews. To make sure, the charge asked the political counsellor to get in touch with him and determine what he actually wanted. It was later found out that Afshar wanted to discuss matters other than Jewish affairs. He told the embassy's political officer that he was a graduate of higher institutions in Tabriz and Orumiyeh and had been through several American universities such as



Idaho, Oklahoma, Chicago and Johns Hopkins and had a doctorate in geology. He (said) he had also completed a short term of studies at Iran's military staff college before he had returned to the United States to complete his studies. Following oil nationalization, he had been recalled to Iran to help in the country's oil-exploration program, starting in the Qom oil fields. He was later assigned to Tehran University and finally elected a Majlis deputy from Orumiyeh in 1956. Disenchanted, he left politics in 1961 and returned to his teaching job at Tehran University.

4. Afshar said that while people like him were not quite happy during the shah's regime, most of the people were now tired of the mullahs. He said it was quite obvious now that they were incapable of running a modern economy. He said he had just returned from Orumiyeh where he had been witness to clashes between local authorities and the Kurds at Serow. He said that every district in Kordestan was under complete control of either Kurds or Iraqis. He said that more than six gendarmerie posts had been captured without any resistance and the revolutionary guards that had been sent to defend them had been surrounded and suffered many casualties. He believed the guardians were undisciplined and untrained and were no match even for unorganized Kurds. He said that the army in Orumiyeh had refused to fight.

5. Afshar said that under the circumstances, the situation was ideal for what he had in mind. He believed that organizing a 20,000- to 30,000-man force in Azarbaijan was a simple task and could later be trained in the isolated areas of Kordestan and then dispatched to the northwestern part of Iran. He said that 18 million Turks lived in Iran, 16 million of whom were Azari Turks scattered from Azarbaijan to the heart of Tehran. In addition, he said, there were 2 million (Turkish-speaking) Turkmans and Qashqa'is in the northeast and the south. There remained only 9 million pure Persians living in central Iran and surrounded by military Turks, Kurds, Arabs and Baluchis and it was only the clergy that held power among the Persians. If the Turks held the northwest and Tehran they would be helped by the Persian majority in getting rid of the clergy in other parts of the country.

6. Afshar said bluntly that he needed help to implement his plan. At the beginning he needed money the most. The giving of arms and assisting in training would be helpful. The Turks have light hair and blue eyes and would be a good idea if a few foreign advisors helped. He further said that the central government control in Azarbaijan was rather loose and that things could be kept secret. He hoped that the United States could realize the advantages in supporting persons like him. He said he had studied in our schools and believed in what we believed in. He said the real danger lay not in allowing Islamic groups a free field or in the possibility that they would later be thrown out by the leftists. He said the real danger was that if the crisis continued the Soviet Union could take advantage of the situation and interfere. He said that was the most serious danger facing the United States in this part of the world and not

a few leftist Iranians occupying the prime minister's office because only a few Iranians supported and favored Marxists in the country.

7. The embassy's political counsellor advised Afshar that the United States could not support his plan. He was told that this would be against the U.S. policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of Iran. He was also informed that after the Vietnam and Watergate affairs the American people could stomach no more foreign adventures.

Afshar gave an unexpected answer to the counsellor. He said he thought it was important to try to prove his ability and competence in connection with his plan and that he was going to carry it out, anyway.

8. The plan suggested by Afshar is one of the most exciting plots ever brought to the attention of the embassy's political counsellor. Afshar is an education expert who had experienced many hardships in his life. He feels that something is missing in the system and the Islamic republic does not meet his personal values and feelings. What he plans to do is not because of the calamity that has befallen him. He wants to organize the force because of the circumstances. It seems that he has correctly calculated his adversary's weak points. Whether he can succeed in organizing the force no one can tell. If such a force had to be organized, Afshar would be the best person to do it rather than a high-ranking army officer or a highly placed person planning in Paris or in Los Angeles or a young psychologist roving around in Tehran in his BMW automobile or those people who consider plotting as a game.

Laingen

Photo copies of the above-mentioned documents are available at the newspaper's office.

Document number three:

From: The U.S. Embassy in Paris.

To: The State Department, Washington, D.C.

Subject: Former cabinet member foresees possible coup d'etat in Iran.

3 August 1979, No 4739.

1. Entirely secret.

2. Briefly, on 28 July, former Iranian minister of housing and urban development, Hushang Nahavandi, stated that people were very unhappy with the present regime and that the conditions would get even worse. Referring to the Kurds, he called them the strongest elements in the country, adding that government and the army was about to disintegrate. He predicted that a coup d'etat by army generals and aided by the Kurds was

going to take place in 6 to 8 weeks. He believes that if the coup fails, communists will take over. End of summary

3. On 28 July, the former minister of housing and development (1966) and former chancellor of Tehran University (from 1971 until the overthrow of the shah) visited the embassy's cultural affairs officer who is an old friend of his. Nahavandi, who was well informed about developments in Iran, gave a full analysis of the present conditions in Iran. He said that during the overthrow of the shah he had been in hiding. He had then fled to Kordestan where he had many friends among the Kurdish chiefs and from there he had fled to Turkey.

4. Nahavandi described conditions in Iran as serious and deteriorating rapidly. He believed that as chaos spread further the government would be faced with two important and serious problems, the normal habits of the Iranians and their desire for consumer goods. He said that the Tudeh Party had cleverly infiltrated various groups including the military and was waiting for the proper opportunity. He believed that the time was not right for them now as there existed a wave of anticommunist feeling among the people but as the situation turned more chaotic the communists would become more acceptable.

5. Nahavandi described the Kurds as one of the strongest groups (he believed they have 100,000 men under arm) and are well-organized. He said they controlled 100 to 150 square kilometers of Iraq and Turkey and that it was almost impossible to expel them especially now that the central government was falling apart. He also believed that the Kurds were receiving financial assistance (he said from Israel and Saudi Arabia).

6. Nahavandi referred to a military coup d'etat he believed was under preparation and said that it could take place within 6 to 8 weeks. He said several army generals would direct the coup and that if it failed the communists would eventually take over. Nahavandi added that the Kurds will back the coup hoping to gain autonomy. He admitted that there were dangers in the plan but said that the alternative was even more dangerous (a communist takeover of Iran). Anyway, he insisted that at the present time there was no better organized group in Iran than the Kurds.

7. Nahavandi described himself as a monarchist and not a supporter of the shah. He believed it was impossible for the shah to return to Iran but he said that in his opinion the best system of government for Iran was a constitutional monarchy in the British model. He plans to stay in Paris and hopes to form an opposition nucleus around himself.

#### Embassy Takeover Praised

Tehran SOBH-E-AZADEGAN in Persian 19 Feb 80 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Hojja-leslam Gholam Hosseyn Haqqani, religious leader in Bandar-e-'Abbas and the Imam's representative, with SOBH-E-AZADEGAN correspondent Ahmad Meshki in that city; date not given]

[Excerpts] Question: What is your opinion about matters revealed by the student-followers of the Imam's line?

Answer: I have not been in Tehran recently to be able to pass judgment on their revelations. What I can say is that their's was a 100-percent revolutionary move, giving vitality to the Iranian nation by having been able to occupy the former embassy and the spy nest in order to legitimately demand the return of the deposed shah. Anyway, the move was a revolutionary one which had the support of the Imam, the clergy and the people, raising the prestige of our struggle worldwide.

Despite efforts by the United States to turn the hostage issue against our revolution by carrying out a propaganda campaign in the press and mass media against us, under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni and the clergy, not only did it not harm us, we were benefited because we were able to prove our points and make it known that the United States had, under the name of an embassy, established here a center for espionage. Although many (embassy) documents were destroyed, yet the existing ones point to a series of strange dealings indicating that continuous espionage activity had been carried out. Well, I believe that a series of revelations were useful and necessary and that the Imam and the people would have liked them to be made public. Now, to what extent some material should have been made public through radio and television, involving the names of officials, say, for example, such as the president and others, which might have required later clarification, we cannot be sure. We do not say, of course, that documents should not be made public, even if they concern the clergy. What we insist upon is that whatever is said and is made public must be documented.

The point that I would like to make here is, as the students (militants) have admitted in their interviews, it is important for the people to realize that they have no executive power. We confirm and respect what they have done and that they should continue their occupation of the nest of spies and the holding of the hostages. As the deposed Mohammad Reza Khan has said that if he were to be tried then all U.S. presidents should also stand trial, all those who had links and dealings with the United States, whose links benefited the United States and hindered our revolutionary movement, should be considered antirevolutionary and pro-United States. This is quite clear and obvious. But they (the student militants) should not act as if they are the executive power. They should support the president, the future Islamic parliament and later, the Islamic government. They should act with a greater sense of responsibility and with consultation which I consider very important and in which I believe. We support these dear ones who have rendered valuable service and brought vitality to our revolution. They also have the support of the people but they should stand united with all religious, revolutionary and governmental organs and even cooperate with them in their revelation (of embassy documents) in order to be able to reap the utmost benefit. They should not act in such a manner that could ultimately do them harm. It is not

only my opinion, but that of the nation too, that they should be supported and confirmed. As the students have said themselves, they are the followers of the Imam's line. What we ask of them is that they should be 100 percent so and they shall enjoy our support as long as they remain so. Everyone makes mistakes, of course. But as we have told the president that if, God forbid, he acted contrary to the constitution we would stand up to him, we would also act against anyone acting against Islam regardless of his good record. These (militant students), our dear brothers, have done well and I cannot say enough about their bold move. But, at the same time, they are not saints and if they were to move in a direction contrary to the wish and satisfaction of the Imam, well, they would not find me in agreement with them. It all boils down to this.

9561

CSO: 4906



## MO'INFAR EXPLAINS POLICY ON GAS EXPORTS TO USSR

Teheran SOBH-E AYANDEGAN in Persian 24 Feb 80 p 10

[Text] The price of gas exported to the USSR has been revised three times within the past few years. The last price before the revolution was 19.96 rubles per 1,000 cubic meters; \$0.63 per million BTU.

The annual export of gas to the USSR has been equal to 10 billion cubic meters. However, after the revolution, due to drop in oil production and the expansion of domestic networks, this figure was reduced considerably to 4 to 4.5 billion cubic meters a year. 'Ali Akbar Mo'infar, minister of petroleum, announced the above matter and said: The agreement on export of natural gas to the USSR has been part of an agreement signed between the governments of Iran and the Soviet Union (the first pipeline contract) on 13 January 1966. According to this contract for receiving natural gas, the Soviet Union is committed to cooperate in establishing a foundry, construction of a gas pipeline, establishing a car-manufacturing factory and other activities. Within the framework of this contract, the primary price of exported gas was 6 rubles per 1,000 cubic meters, \$0.16 per million BTU. One-third of the price is variable and adjustable according to changes in the price of fuel oil of Mahshahr. Two-thirds is a fixed price. The price of fuel oil became a base for changes in the price. If changes in the price of fuel oil is more than 30 percent compared to the base price, both parties will make a general revision on the price of gas by negotiations and agreement.

Mo'infar continued and said: In general the price of gas had been considered at a very low level in this contract. In the beginning, it had been agreed on the price of 6 rubles per 1,000 cubic meters which equals \$0.98 for every barrel of fuel oil. Compared to the price of fuel oil which had been about \$1.60 in 1966, the price had been 63 percent lower and so on. The last price prior to the revolution which had been increased to 19.96 rubles (equal to \$3.86 per barrel of fuel oil) as compared to the price of fuel oil in the same date (\$11.81 per barrel) was again 286 percent lower. The reason why this situation got worse is the manner of adjusting the price of gas in relation to the price of fuel oil which, in reality, is the second problem in the contract for gas exports to the USSR.

The minister added: In the past, in negotiations held to revise the price of gas, the representatives of the Soviet Gas Company stated that the reason for the increase in the price of fuel oil is the drop in the value of the dollar. They added that since the price of exported gas is paid in rubles and on barter exchange deals and there has been no change in the value of the ruble, therefore, Iran should not expect to increase the price of gas in rubles commensurate with the price of fuel oil which is in dollars. Mo'infar continued and said: The issue of receiving rubles and making barter exchange deals on this contract has created many problems for the National Gas Company. On the one hand, the price of exported gas was increased gradually within the past years and obviously there will be a more rapid increase in the future. On the other hand, Iran's imports from the Soviet Union have been diminishing for various reasons. Therefore, the rubles earned by the National Gas Company are left without use and until the rubles are used for payment against credits or imports from the Soviet Union, the Central Bank will not pay the gas company in rials. The barter exchange in the contract causes imports of commodities from the USSR on which there is no control over the price and annual increase rate. According to my information, the value of goods is determined based on volume and weight and there is no price index on the type of commodity. The minister said: On 30 September 1979 and 1 October 1979, some negotiations were held with the Soviet Union in Teheran. However, the representatives of that country avoided making any explicit comments with the excuse that the issues under consideration are within the framework of the contract signed between the two countries in 1966 and that they are not the representatives of the Soviet Government. Regarding the price under consideration by the National Gas Company, which is about \$3.80 per million BTU (compared to \$.63 prior to the revolution) they said that this price is at a very high level and that it is far more than the price that the Soviet Union gets from West Europe for exported gas. Following that meeting, the Soviet Gas Company showed no interest in continuing the negotiations and it was evading the matter. Recently the National Gas Company informed them that it has increased the price of gas unilaterally to the level of Mahshahr fuel oil. And so, the price has been increased from 19.96 rubles (\$.063 per ruble) last year to 116.65 rubles (\$3.64 per million BTU). Of course the Soviet reaction is not yet known.

Then, Mo'infar announced the proposals of the National Gas Company as follows:

The price of exported gas should be at least equal to the heating value of the fuel oil. In other words, for equal heating value, the price of the two products should be equal. Although the fuel gas is creditable, it costs more than fuel oil to transfer it to the Soviet border. Furthermore, on other export projects, the National Gas Company believes that the price of gas inside the refinery should be at the same level as the price of fuel oil. Considering the high cost of ships [freight], the CIF would be higher. However, regarding the Soviet Union, the National Gas Company has agreed to make the cost of FRANCO (price at the border) equal to the price of fuel oil which, in reality, is ideal for other countries importing natural gas. Therefore, there is no reason for refusing Iran's request.

Regarding future adjustments in the price, the National Gas Company believes that the whole price (and not just one-third of it, as imposed previously) should be considered in adjusting with Iran's light crude oil. Regarding the manner of payment, considering the matters mentioned above, it has been suggested either to pay all or at least a portion of the payment in exchangeable foreign currencies such as the German Mark. Finally, the National Gas Company does not have a favorable view about renewing the above-mentioned contract. However, if the Soviet Union and the parties for the contract on the second pipeline are ready, the contract on the first pipeline can be combined with the contract on the second pipeline by incorporating some terms and in this way, the Soviet Union would deliver an equivalent amount of gas exported to that country to other buyers: Czechoslovakia and West European countries on the border of Europe.

9156

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REVISED LIST OF MAJLES CANDIDATES PUBLISHED

Teheran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Feb 80 p 12

[Text] The deadline for the registration of candidates for the parliament is over. According to Zaynol'abedin, deputy of the election staff of the Ministry of Interior, since yesterday they have started to study the qualifications of the candidates and that this evening the exact number of candidates will be announced. During this week, the list of those candidates who have the right to participate in the elections will be announced.

Yesterday afternoon the Islamic Republic Party held a meeting with its candidates in its office. In the meeting the names of 27 candidates were announced. On Thursday the Mojahedine Khalq held rallies in Teheran and other cities. This is the beginning of the election campaign by these two groups. On this occasion the Islamic Republic Party will hold a seminar tomorrow at 1700 hours in Khazaneh Qal'a Morqi' Abu Zar 20 Meter Avenue, Abu Zar Circle, with Mohammad Javad Bahonar, Zavareyi and Faramarz Rahbari attending. Questions will be answered. Also the staff of the Islamic Revolutionary Congress has announced that this week the Majles candidates will be announced in Teheran and the provinces. The following are the latest announcements and election lists.

Hamnam Candidates for the Cities

The delegation introducing Majles candidates has issued a statement announcing the names of the candidates of this group (Hamnam) for the cities. The statement indicates: As Iran's first Islamic Majles will play a vital role in the planning and construction of a unique Islamic society which, God willing, will become a favorable pattern for the people of the world. To introduce individuals who would be capable of establishing such a Majles and to help have precise supervision over the elections, the Hamnam group invites fellow citizens to cooperate. Sisters and brothers are requested to please call telephone numbers 839668 and 639667 to cooperate in this important matter. Meanwhile, after necessary studies, the list of candidates from some of the cities are announced as follows:

Kazerun, Eng Rajab 'ali Taheri; Nain and Kuhpayeh, Dr Mehran (Feshareki) Damghan, Seyyed Mohammad 'Ali Tabataba'i; Ashtiyar, Dr Gholam Reza Danesh;

Dashtestan (Barazjan), Dr Mohammad Mehdi J'afari; Saveh, Akbar Amini; Karaj, Hoseyn Shah Hoseyni, Hojjatoleslam J'afar Shajuni; Taft, Yazd, Hojjatoleslam Mehdi Rabani Amleshi; Shahr-e Kord, Mirzayi; Borujerd, Hoseyn Gholami Tuqchi; Bijar, Hojjatoleslam Rahmani; Khoramabad, Dr Hoseyn 'Aly; Shabestar, Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Shabestari; Qazvin, Ahmad Sadr Haj Seyyed Javadi, Dr Kazem Yazdi; Tabriz, Hojjatoleslam Abolfazl Reyhani Mosavai, Dr Seyyed Mohammad Milani, Dr Saroukhani, Eng Mohammad 'Ali Sadat, Dr Jalal Ghanizadeh; Mahalat, Hojjatoleslam Abolfazl Mahlati.

Teheran's final list of candidates from the Islamic Republic Party was announced by the election staff of this party after a meeting had been held with the candidates and is as follows: Dr Hasan Ayat, Dr Mohammad Javad Bahonar, Sa'id Amani, Mrs Behruzi, Seyyed Kazem Bojnurdi, Dr Jasebi, Fakhr-eldin Hejazi, Hojjatoleslam Seyyed 'Ali Khamneh'i, Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i, Seyyed Reza Zavare'yi, Sarhadizadeh, Dr Shayvard, Habibollah Askaroladi, Hojjatoleslam Hadi Ghafari, Dr Mohmud Kashani, Hoseyn Kamali, Goharolshari'ah Dastghayeb, Dr Lavasani, Asadollah Lajevardi, Javad Mansuri, Mo'adikhah, 'Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, Dr Vahid, Dr Velayati, Dr Mohammad 'Ali Hadi, Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Meanwhile, the Iranian National Party started its activities by dispatching Daryush Foruhar, the party's secretary, and holding various meetings and speeches. Also on Thursday there was a meeting held by the party in the party's hall. In the gathering held in Qazvin, Dr Nasr Takmil, Homayon and Daryush Foruhar delivered speeches.

The public relations bureau of the Iranian National Party has reported that in the next few days the number of candidates for the Majles will be increased. Among them there is Khosrow Seyf, assistant to the secretary of the party.

Hasan Nainiyan, who is a candidate of the Iranian National Party from Hamadan, suggested in the Islamic Congress that one of the qualifications for Majles candidates which calls for the candidates not to have been members of the Majles since 1342 [1963-1964] be changed to 28 Mordad 32 [19 August 1953] and that also they should not have held any positions of director general in any organization. His proposal was approved by the cong

#### J'afari's Remarks

Seyyed Mohammad Mehdi J'afari has thanked the parties and people who have announced him as a candidate. He has announced that he is not affiliated with any party or group.

Also the staff of the Islamic Revolutionary Congress has announced that the list of candidates from Teheran will be announced shortly.

The sympathizers of the struggling Moslem Movement in Kermanshah has announced that since this organization does not have a candidate in



Kermanshah, its supporters will vote for those who have a clear background of struggles who are familiar with the people's problems, have mental versatility and believe in the antidictatorship and anticolonialism of Imam Khomeyni's policy and are also familiar with the sophistication of imperialism and deeply understand the necessity for fighting it.

#### National Supervision of the Elections

The national supervision staff for free elections has warned President Bani-Sadr in a statement that the president, who is responsible for the three forces, should see that free elections are held and prevent any deviations to protect the blood of thousands of martyrs. This staff has referred to some of the candidates of the responsible authorities of the Ministry of Interior and said that it is considered against free elections and in some part it has indicated: We announce that any kind of accusation made against the candidates is against Islam and the principles of freedom. If anyone has an unsuitable background and has been related to the satanic administration and is elected, it is then the parliament's duty to prove his crime and refuse his credentials.

#### Other Progressive Candidates

The executive board of the council for introducing progressive and revolutionary candidates announced the list of the third group of candidates: Mazandaran Province: Shahsavari, Mostafa Nikkar, from the Department of Education from Mojahedin; Katul Sheykh Mohammad Mazidi, student fighter from Mojahedin; Sari, Hasan Mohammadi, member of Mojahedin-e Khalq; Khorasan, Kashmar Marata'ali Mirza'yi, farmer; Bojnurd, Hamid Rabunik, member of the organization; Neyshabur, Abol Hasan Taqiabadi, Tarqabeh 'Ali Saburi, member of Mojahedin; Birjand, 'Ali Farashadi, member of Mojahedin; Malayer, Mohammad Valiyar Mohammadi, driver; Teheran Province: Tafresh, Sa'id Moniri, member of the organization; Saveh, Mohammad Noruzi, member of Mojahedin; Central Province: Mahalat, Abdolmahd Akbari, employee; Hamadan, Mrs Sakineh (Heshmat) Tiftakchi, from Mojahedin. The board has announced that in those areas where there are no candidates introduced or where there is a shortage in the list, it will support those who accept the 12-article program of Mas'ud Rajavi.

#### Ayatollah Lahuti

In an interview on the Majles elections, Ayatollah Hasan Lahuti said: This election is a religious representation and an irrevocable contract. People should elect representatives who would also carry out their religious Islamic obligations.

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CSO: 4906

# CONSTRUCTION CRUSADE UNDERTAKES RURAL PROJECTS

Teheran SOBH-E AYANDEGAN in Persian 24 Feb 80 p 11

[Report by AZADEGAN Correspondent: "I Did Not Know How To Convey the Message of the Revolutionary Martyrs to the People"]

[Text] Babak Cicy--He was sitting in the room to read his book until dawn. It was past midnight when the police entered his room, seized him and hit him on the head with his book. They said: "Don't you know that books of Dr Shari'ati, Khomeyni and Taleqani are banned and forbidden? Why do you read them?" They took him to prison. In his words he always said that we should go to the villages and take care of the deprived and the poor people who do not have water, bath facilities, etc. The forces should be sent to the villages and help as much as possible. His words were always on my mind, until I heard that he was killed in the demonstrations. When I was going to the cemetery, I asked when he had been released from prison. They told me: Yesterday. I became very upset and confused. Every night when I wanted to sleep, I would remember his words, which echoed in my ears, that we should go to the villages and help the villagers. I did not know how to convey the message of the martyrs to the people. Until I heard that in his speech to the people, Imam Khomeyni had told the people: I extend my hand to the nation to build the ruins with the help of each other. The people started to migrate to the villages and cultivated land in groups. Together with the deprived people, they harvested, cleaned the subterranean canals and the Moslem youths established the construction crusade for more work. The people referred to the crusade and with a lot of forces and the required equipment, they set out. The development and medical groups went to the poverty-stricken areas, the difficult and hot-climate regions and took medicine with them. They migrated to help the inhabitants of those areas. To strengthen them, the Imam ordered putting money, equipment and government vehicles at their disposal. The construction crusade started to work everywhere. In the small and large towns, close to 5,000 baths were built. The ones which were ruined where the villagers did not have the money for repairs and could not take a bath at all were repaired with crusade money, so that the deprived people could take baths. In some villages because of lack of schools, the children were illiterate. The crusade built schools wherever there were none and many movies were shown. The books that the former regime was afraid that

the people would become aware of were sent to the villages. The revolutionary youth work with love and suffer in the heat and cold. I felt that they have conveyed the message of the martyrs. There are also some who, to damage the revolution, sit on furniture next to a stove or cooler and watch uncomfortable sites of the deprived people from their pleasant place. They write flyers sending regards to the hard-working people and the workers saying that they support them and that the government is not doing anything for them; that there has been no change and nothing has been done for the people. Some of them would leave their house and make speeches saying that they sympathize with the people, as though there has not been any revolution. They attract a group of unthoughtful youth toward themselves and prevent them from going to the villages to help the poverty-stricken people of our country. They invite them to sit by the stoves and write flyers to support the hard-working class and against the government. They are not shamed by the martyrs who have died. However, on the occasion of the anniversary of the victory of Iran's revolution and the death of the innocent youth, we join the construction crusade.

The construction crusade of the city of Babak has announced its work for 6 months as follows:

1. Construction of 25 bathhouses and repair of 39 others in various villages;
2. Construction of 25 schools, from one to four classes, as well as repair and fencing of 30 other schools;
3. Construction of 18 mosques in various parts of the city;
4. Construction of five libraries and three mortuaries;
5. Three power generators for the hospitals of Meymand, Gomsorkh and Jozam;
6. Construction of more than 30 bridges in the city;
7. Construction of a street in Harat and ballasting it (laying gravel on the road);
8. Ballasting four streets and alleys of Marvast;
9. Ballasting the alleys of Khatun Abad;
10. Repairing and ballasting the roads of Hashem Abad and Maleki Harat;
11. Repairing and ballasting part of Haraborjan Road;
12. Repairing and completing Meymand Road in the city of Babak; repairing 30 kilometers, completing Abdar Road of Babak City--26 kilometers of repair, and completing Karam Road of Babak City for the length of 32 kilometers;

13. Construction of three flood embankments in Harat and Marvast;
  14. Repair and completion of 185 subterranean canals in various villages which had been discontinued due to the cold winter weather;
  15. Construction of four high schools with the budget for free meals with the cooperation of bricklayers and workers of Babak City. Two buildings in the city of Babak, one in Dahj, 84 kilometers from the city of Babak and another in Harat, 72 kilometers from the city of Babak;
  16. The cultural group of the construction crusade has taken books, pictures and posters to more than 40 villages.
- By showing films and giving speeches, it has given guidance to the villagers. They are preparing classes for fighting illiteracy and teaching the Koran to the students.

9156

CSO: 4906

IRAQ

BRIEFS

BANKING AGREEMENT WITH JAMAICA--Baghdad, 23 Mar--Iraq and Jamaica signed an agreement for financial and banking cooperation today. The agreement was signed by Iraqi Minister of Finance Thamir Razuqi and by Jamaican Minister of Justice, Constitutional Reform and Labor R. Carl Rattray. The Jamaican minister arrived here the day before yesterday. He held talks with Iraqi officials on bilateral relations and means of strengthening them. [Text] [JN232115 Baghdad INA in Arabic 2100 GMT 23 Mar 80 JN]

CSO: 4802



PRESIDENT SENDS CABLE TO HUNGARY'S KADAR

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 24 Mar 80 JN

["Text" of cable from Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad to Janos Kadar, first secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Central Committee, on occasion of the 12th Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party conference, date not specified]

[Text] I take the opportunity of the convocation of the 12th conference of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party to send, on behalf of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party command and myself, warmest greetings to you and to the comrade members of the conference, along with our militant solidarity.

I would like to express satisfaction with the development of our two parties' relations of cooperation over past years. These relations have contributed to strengthening and developing the relations of friendship and cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic, for the good of our two peoples and in consolidation of their joint struggle against the forces of aggression, particularly Zionism and imperialism, for the attainment of justice and peace in the world.

I would also like to express our appreciation for the Hungarian People's Republic's principled stand in support of the Palestinian people's struggle against Zionist aggression, which is backed by imperialist forces.

I wish your conference complete success in achieving your people's objectives of continuing development and prosperity, under the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and your wise directives.

Finally, I extend sincere wishes for your health and happiness.

CSO: 4802

CAPTURE, CONFESSION OF ALLEGED SABOTEUR

Alleged Saboteur Arrested

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 26 Feb pp 1,5

[Article: "Arrested in the South: The Saboteur Who Came From Libya"]

[Text] He wanted to blow up:

- the Arab League headquarters
- the French embassy
- the Party headquarters
- and the Tunisian Radio and Television building.

We have learned from an authoritative source that, on 22 February, the security forces have arrested Bechir Ben Dhaou Sifi, a dangerous saboteur who had been hired by the Libyan regime to commit acts of sabotage against the French embassy in Tunis, the Party headquarters, the Arab League headquarters and the Tunisian Radio and Television building.

This criminal was arrested in Dhibet (Medenine governorship) after he had clandestinely entered the country coming from Libya; he was carrying 4 kilograms of explosives.

It has been established that the Arab Liaison Bureau in Tripoli is the instigator of this sabotage operation and that a certain Hedi Ben Fadhel, director of said bureau, personally supervised the preparations after the attack against Gafsa had failed.

Among the Libyan officers who were in contact with Bechir Sifi were: Mohamed Naïel, well known of the Tunisians since his trial for attempted murder on the prime minister.

The head of the Arab Liaison Bureau had given Bechir Sifi money in Libyan currency and all that was required to perform the acts of sabotage planned, namely explosives wrapped in plastic bags and provided with detonators and ignition fuses. He was supposed to place these explosives (which have a 150 meter radius range) inside sewer openings in front of the target buildings.

Bechir Sifi, born in Tataouine in 1932, has been known for a few years as a smuggler. After the attack against Gafsa, Libyan authorities had sent him on a first mission in Tunisian territory to provide them with intelligence on the positions of Tunisian armed forces in the area near the border.

#### Confession of Alleged Saboteur

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 27 Feb 80 p 4

[Report on interrogation of Bechir Ben Dhaou Essifi; "Confession of Bechir Ben Dhaou Essifi: 'The Arab Liaison Bureau Again'"; date and place of interrogation not given]

[Text] [Question] Name, date and place of birth?

[Answer] Bechir Ben Dhaou Ben Monsour Ben Al Essifi, born in 1932 in Tataouine.

[Question] Why are you here?

[Answer] I have been arrested.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] I was engaged in smuggling with Libya. I found myself on my own, I fell into a trap and this is how I came here.

[Question] What did you have then?

[Answer] I was carrying beer cases into Libya where I sold them. After the Gafsa attempt, they had sent two people to me, Bechir El Hafien and Taieb Ben Saad El Wafi.

Taieb is the brother of Saad, a Gafsa commando. They told me they needed me--I said all right--and that I must escort them to Tripoli. "Khelifa Maiz asked how you were, he wanted to see you. He needs you." They took me by car to Tripoli, to the Arab Liaison Bureau. There, I met with Libyan officers. They asked what my name was, and I told them adding "alias Bechir Ould El Hajjale." We had a meeting. "Khelifa Maiz spoke well of you and said you might help us. You know the country well and you can be very useful." I accepted. We waited for Maiz who was not there at the time.

[Question] Who is Khelifa Maiz?

[Answer] One of the elements who are in Libya.

[Question] At the Liaison Bureau?

[Answer] Yes, at the Liaison Bureau. Then we went down to the drawing room. We waited, but neither Khelifa Maiz nor Taleb had arrived. Then, I asked the Libyan officer whose name, I believe, is Hedi, and whose attributions I do not know--he is the one who had shown us into the drawing room--if he could tell me where Khelifa Maiz lives, so I could go and see him. He answered that he did not know where he lives. Then he made a telephone call and was able to contact him at the hotel, and told him I was here.

A while later, Khelifa Maiz arrived with a bag in his hand. He assured us he had just arrived from Benghazi, by plane, where he had had a meeting with Colonel Qadhdhafi, and he introduced us to a Libyan official.

[Question] Who was it?

[Answer] Hedi, they say he is an officer, maybe an official. He was accompanied by others.

[Question] Was it, in fact, the director of the Bureau?

[Answer] It was. Hedi Fadhl thanked me again and assured me of full assistance from the Libyan government.

[Question] Exactly, what was your mission?

[Answer] First, they asked if I had been in the army. I told them that, yes, I had been in the French army. They told me then that everything is changed and that now is the electronic era.

Khelifa Maiz answered that they needed me as a guide and that I could smuggle weapons and inform the people who enter Tunisia clandestinely, since I was a smuggler and knew the area well.

[Question] You mean, provide intelligence?

[Answer] Of course. Then they accepted since I could be useful to them. They gave me 100 Libyan pounds. Khelifa Maiz, Bechir and Taleb took me by car to the border. The driver was a warrant officer in the Libyan army. We went to get a Tunisian, also from Tataouine, whom I knew by sight and who was volunteering. I believe he is from the Ben Chti Zorghani family.

[Question] Does the latter live in Libya?

[Answer] Yes, I figured that out when one of them asked him how a certain Ould Jadoual was doing.

From there, they drove us to Bir El Ghenam, to the camp. There I found Hedi Zaguer and the group who had arrived before me the day before. They got out of the car and I stayed in it. I saw two groups of 60 people each

who were training under the orders of a Libyan armed with a machine gun. I was told that these were the people who were brought into one of the camps. Right after that, I heard some noise. I saw a person in a black coat. I asked them what it was. I was told he was a Hammami who had just come back from Lebanon. When he was asked if he wanted to enlist in the camp for some more training, he told them he had served in Lebanon where he had stayed two years. And for that, why did they want that he should train some more! "If there is a front where you plan to send me, I am ready to go there right now. If there is no such front, there is no point in my training with you."

These were the questions I asked and the answers they gave me.

From there, we left. Once in Tiji, on the road to Nabout, we got out of the car, me, Bechir and Taleb.

There, Khelifa Maiz and the officer took me to the border and told me to gather at least all the necessary intelligence and to come back after seven days. "You must be back with us on the seventh day." We parted at the place called "Hidha Dhiba." There, I entered Tunisian territory where I stayed between 7 and 10 days. Then, I entered again clandestinely into Libyan territory. I met them at Nabout. Taleb and Khelifa Maiz took me to the Liaison Bureau where, after greeting me, they asked me what I had seen and noticed on Tunisian territory, and what intelligence I had gathered. They asked how many troops there were, and I told them that the army was everywhere and the border was sealed.

After this questioning, they advised me to get some rest at the "Mimoun" hotel.

[Question] In Tripoli?

[Answer] Yes, in Tripoli... "And knowing your mission, you must resume as usual," they told me. There, I spent a couple of days pacing up and down every hour. I came back on the 20th.

[Question] The 20th of the current month?

[Answer] Yes. From there, I went out with Maiz; we went to a prison not far from Tripoli, called "El Ghirane." They told me that night that there were 600 Tunisian prisoners. In the morning, we went by car to see them; there was a man with us who said he was a Chadian or something like that. He was a black African, who spoke African, and was working with him.

At the door of the prison, we found a row of policemen. They told me and the other to stay in the car while Maiz could get in because they knew him. And since then, they had seen him only at night. He came back to tell me that he had gone to see the 600 prisoners, that he had a meeting with them and had told them they would be freed and work for the revolution.



He "consulted" with them. "You are going to be freed," he told them, "you are going to work for your country and for revolution in your country." When he gave them drinks and asked them to choose between revolution, Tunisia and its government, they all answered they preferred their country and their government, and that they were against revolution, even if this should mean death. "All right!" he retorted. "Sit down, you are going to see what it will cost you to be against revolution!..."

Then, he called 10 guards armed with machine guns and pickaxe handles, who started beating them up all they could. They would stop the beating only when the prisoners shouted "Long live the revolution, I am with you!"

After this "lesson," he chose 300 from them who were fit for military service. the other 300, he said he would take over there, near Benghazi, in a deserted area from where they would not be able to get back and make revelations.

I stayed there until the morning and at 2.00 hours they called me. He himself came to tell me that the Liaison Bureau was asking for me.

[Question] Who?

[Answer] Khelifa Maiz. During the interview, I met two people whom I had never seen before.

[Question] New recruits?

[Answer] Yes, new recruits. One of them was from Medenine; I do not know whether he was from Tunisia or Libya, but they said he was born in Medenine. He was a lieutenant. The other's name was Mohamed Naili, the one who attempted an operation in Tunisia and was arrested.

[Question] Which attempt?

[Answer] The attempt against Mr Hedi Nour's life.

[Question] In 1976?

[Answer] I did not know him. But, talking with him, he asked me what I could do, what my mission was, and what I wanted to do. I told him that I was carrying out the orders which he and the others gave me, and that was all. "I do whatever you want me to do."

On the doorstep, Khelifa Maiz informed me that the mission was more serious this time. It was no longer a matter of mere intelligence. It was a matter of bombs. "Bombs?" I answered, "I don't know how to handle bombs! I am afraid to get killed." He told me there was no danger.

Then, we discussed what kind of bombs were involved, and the car, and all that. I was supposed to go to Tataouine, to the police station in Tataouine, and how was I going to explode the bombs there? But, little by little, we were getting away from the aforementioned location. We reached Medenine, then Jerba, then he told them: "But, in fact, exactly where? The explosions must take place not in the South, but in Tunis, in the capital itself?"

[Question] By "he," you mean Naili?

[Answer] Yes, Naili. If we began with an operation in the South, the door would be closed to us and we would not be able to attack again. We would leave that for another time.

"It has to be in Tunis. You must manage to reach Tunis clandestinely." Then we agreed that I would go to Tunis. Then they advised me to get some rest at the hotel until the next day; they said they would prepare the bombs and explain to me how to handle them and where I should explode them. The day after that, I saw them again at the same place. I even met with two new people. Naili and two others. I had come with Khelifa Maiz. One of the two people's first name was Belgacem; the second was a young man whose identity I did not know.

We remained a long time discussing the location from where the weapons could be smuggled in, and whether I should be accompanied by two people with weapons. I told them that this was not possible, the two people would automatically be arrested. They suggested that I take them to a nearby location from where they could enter Tunisian territory clandestinely. I told them I could not. We would all get caught.

Khelifa Maiz said he knew where they could enter. Through the "Nechhed Salah" road, a strategic point where there are cars to take them to Tunisian territory.

Then they were silent.

They brought the explosives--five sticks and not the four you can see now--with fuses. They showed me the fuses and told me how to ignite them. One of the sticks was put aside--five, that was too much for him. Too heavy.

That way, I was left with only four.

[Question] The main thing is that they showed you how to use them?

[Answer] Yes, they told me how to place them. All I had to do was to ignite them with a cigarette or a match, at the location where I was supposed to place them. Then they told me that was all, and we went out.

[Question] Did they tell you where you were to place them?

[Answer] They told me I had to place one at the French embassy, one at the Tunisian Radio and Television building, one at the Party headquarters, and the last load at the Arab League headquarters; and that this had to be done in one day or in a couple of days, depending on circumstances, until the objectives had been achieved.

[Question] In the capital?

[Answer] Yes, in the capital. After these meetings, they gave me 300 Libyan pounds as a reward.

[Question] Who?

[Answer] Hedi Fadhl.

[Question] These attempts were to be made during the day or at night?

[Answer] They left it up to me, depending on circumstances and the occasion. Then, near the border, a Citroen 504 was waiting for us. Naili had a machine gun and a transmitter. He asked me where the area nearest to the Libyan centers was. I told him they all were.

[Question] Whom?

[Answer] Naili of course; Belgacem told him El Barraka. However, I was not sure that this was Naili. So, I asked him if Naili was not dead. He answered that he is the Naili in question and assured me that his death was only a false rumor.

He left me at the border, about one kilometer from Dhibat. So, I walked toward Tunisian territory with the explosive loads. After walking hardly one kilometer, I was arrested by a policeman.

[Question] Did Khelifa Maiz tell you some other things in Tripoli?

[Answer] He mentioned 4 people; in fact, there are 14 who have just come back from Lebanon; besides, I saw these 4 at the Liaison Bureau and at the Mimoun hotel. I believe that the latter did not agree with Khelifa Maiz, so they went back to the camp where Naili is. I believe they are going to send them to Tunis via France, and from everywhere as reinforcement. They told me, among other things, that "on the day of the explosions, other people will be in Tunis, near you."

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CSO:4400

END

SELECTIVE LIST OF JPRS SERIAL REPORTS

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA SERIAL REPORTS

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT  
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

WORLDWIDE SERIAL REPORTS

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Environmental Quality  
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Epidemiology  
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Law of the Sea  
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Nuclear Development and Proliferation  
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Telecommunications Policy, Research and Development

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